-Adware Remover Gold -
Scud Missle
September 11 Twin Towers Memorial Photos Videos & News Archive of the WTC Attack
Home Message Board Guest Book Live Chat Guest Map Mailing List Tell a Friend


Home
Up

Discuss this Topic

News From GOD

Tell A Friend

THE MORON MAJORITY

Scud Missle Photos & News

Bernard Rostker
Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses Department of Defense

Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans' concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996, and has continued to investigate topics related to reports of chemical warfare agent incidents.

To inform the public about the progress of these efforts, the Department of Defense is publishing on the Internet and elsewhere accounts that may contribute to the discussion of possible causes of illnesses of Gulf War veterans, along with documentary evidence or personal testimony used in compiling the accounts. This information paper will aid in understanding incidents involving Iraq's use of Scud missiles.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  SUMMARY

II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

III.  IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

IV.  SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A.  Threat Estimates Before Operation Desert Storm
B.  Information During the War
C.  Post-War Findings

V.  IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

A.  Introduction
B.  Total Scud Firing Incidents
C.  Scud Incidents in the Eastern KTO

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

D. Scud Incidents in the Riyadh Area

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

E.  Scud Incidents in the KKMC and Hafir Al Batin Areas

1.  Summary
2.  Details on Selected Incidents

F.  Scud Incidents in Israel

VI.  FALSE ALARMS AND FALSE TARGETS

A.  False Alarms
B.  Patriot False Target Detections

VII.  SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS

VIII.  COALITION RESPONSE TO SCUD THREAT


IX.  THE RESIDUAL THREAT

X.  SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

TAB A ' Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

TAB B ' Bibliography

TAB C ' Chemical Evidence ' Scud Incidents In KTO

TAB D ' Analysis of CURR Scud Incident List

END NOTES

 

I.  SUMMARY

Iraq began launching short-range ballistic missiles (known as Scuds) at Israel and Coalition forces soon after the Coalition's Gulf War air campaign began on January 17, 1991. Many Gulf War veterans observed or became aware of incoming or overflying Scud missiles, Patriot missiles fired in defense, and Scud missile or debris impacts. American and other Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations knew that Iraq had the capability to use chemical and biological weapons, and Scud missile attacks represented a significant cause for concern for anyone within their range.

This Information Paper offers a primer on Scud missiles and describes Iraq's use of Scuds during the Gulf War. The paper also briefly reviews topics related to counter-Scud operations, including Patriot missile defenses.

Iraq filled both chemical and biological warheads for their Scud missiles before the Gulf War. However, Iraq probably feared retaliation if they used them. In-depth research for this paper uncovered no hard evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological warheads during the Gulf War. All Scud debris analyzed indicated use of conventional warheads.

Iraq's Scud attacks involved 88 missiles, of which 46 reached Coalition countries in the Kuwait theater of operations and 42 reached or closely approached Israel. A few more probably failed early in flight and struck within Iraq's borders. Iraq told United Nations inspectors after the war that they launched 93 ballistic missiles, 50 against the Coalition in the Kuwait theater of operations and 43 against Israel. Scuds, while inaccurate, nonetheless damaged area targets and caused 28 of the 148 United States battle deaths during the Gulf War. Scuds often broke up on reentry, dispersing propellant that sometimes caused burning sensations of the skin and throat, nausea, headaches, breathing difficulties and other symptoms in some United States servicemembers. Also, Scud attacks and precautionary alerts disrupted lives and operations by forcing passive defense measures and generating stress.

 

II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND[1]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) used the nickname "Scud B" when referring to the Soviet-made, mobile, single-stage, single-warhead, liquid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile (originally designated by the Soviets as the R-17). Within the intelligence community, it also carried the designation SS-1c (SS for surface-to-surface). The Soviets developed this missile from an earlier version (Scud A) fielded in the 1950s, which they based in turn on the infamous German V-2 of World War II. The Scud B model first appeared with Soviet operational forces in 1962.[2]

The Soviet Union provided Iraq with Scuds mounted with conventional warheads during the 1970s and 1980s.[3] During its war with Iran, Iraq first developed modified or "stretched" Scuds, resulting in the Al Hussein model, with enough propellant and range to reach Iran's capital of Tehran. Because Baghdad is closer to the Iran-Iraq border than Tehran, Iran was able to reach Baghdad from much closer range with their own Scuds and did not need longer-range missiles. The Al Hussein closed the "missile gap." During the seven-week "war of the cities" in early 1988, Iraq's Scuds rained terror on Tehran and other Iranian cities while Iran used unmodified Scud Bs against Baghdad and other targets in Iraq. Iraq's missiles with high explosive warheads killed about 2,000 Iranians and injured 6,000. Over a quarter of the population of ten million fled Tehran. In April of 1988, Iran ended its Scud attacks on Iraq and subsequently negotiated for peace.[4] In the wake of his success with the modified Scud, Saddam Hussein sought further improvements with the Al Abbas and the Al Hijarah models.

 

III.  IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES

Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. For this reason, we have used the same shorthand in this paper. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.

fig1s.gif (4163 bytes)

Figure 1.  Scud missile components[5]

Figure 1[5] diagrams the basic components of Iraq's Scuds. Regardless of the variants, original Scud B, Al Hussein, Al Abbas, or Al Hijarah, all of Iraq's Scuds were liquid fueled, short-range ballistic missiles with a crude guidance system. Unsophisticated gyroscopes guided the missile only during powered flight, which lasted about 80 seconds for the Al Hussein variant.[6] Once the rocket motor shut down, the entire missile with the warhead attached coasted unguided to the target area.[7] Consequently, Scuds had notoriously poor accuracy, and the farther they flew, the more inaccurate they became.[8]

Table 1 reflects key data on Iraq's ballistic missiles including the Scud B acquired from the USSR and the three variants produced by Iraq by modifying the original Scud configuration.

 

Table 1. Characteristics of Iraq's selected missiles [9]

 

Scud B

Al Hussein

Al Abbas

Al Hijarah

Length (ft.)

36.8

41

47.6

Unknown

Diameter (in.)

35

35

35

Unknown

Warhead Wt (lbs.)

2,200

1,100

308-550

About 550

Max Range (mi.)

186

373+

500-560

Iraq claimed 466

Accuracy (CEP)[10] (mi.)

0.62

1-2

1.9-3.1

Unknown

Gulf War Involvement

None fired

All but 5 fired were this model

Development stopped in 1990 ' none fired

Iraq claimed 5 fired

 

All of Iraq's Scuds used kerosene as the fuel and some form of red fuming nitric acid, probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)[11] as the oxidizer. Iraq told the United Nations Special Commission inspectors after the war that they had not experimented with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a more powerful (and toxic) fuel than kerosene, for their Scuds, which would require engine redesign. However, inspectors subsequently uncovered evidence that Iraq did experiment with UDMH,[12] but this investigation found no evidence that Iraq switched to UDMH during the Gulf War.

To extend the Scud's range, Iraq cut Scud Bs apart and inserted airframe sections from these missiles into other Scud Bs to increase the capacities of the fuel and oxidizer tanks from about 8,700 pounds to about 11,000 pounds.[13] Iraq also reduced warhead weight from 2,200 pounds to less than 1,100 pounds. (See Table 1 above.)

In 1991, Iraq had three kinds of mobile Scud launchers for its operational Scud models.[14] Other support vehicles included cranes, separate tanker trucks for fuel and oxidizer, command and control vans, and missile resupply vehicles.[15]

Iraq's modifications to the Scud Bs created flight stability problems. Unlike more modern ballistic missile designs, the Scud's warhead does not detach from the rest of the missile after the boost phase (the period when the rocket motor fires and accelerates the missile). The missile body reenters the atmosphere still attached to the warhead. The changes in the center of gravity and weight distribution between the modified warhead and missile body, plus the added speed and subsequent increase in atmospheric heating during reentry, made the missiles unstable and often caused them to disintegrate before impact. Such break-ups degraded accuracy by changing missile trajectory. Iranian reports about Al Hussein attacks during the Iran-Iraq war noted that the missiles frequently broke into pieces. Coalition and Israeli reports about Gulf War Scud attacks contained similar observations (see Section V below).

 

IV.  SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The evidence clearly shows that Saddam Hussein eventually intended to field operational Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads, and he committed substantial resources to that end.[16] However, did Iraq successfully achieve that goal by the time of Operation Desert Storm?

A.  Threat Estimates Before Operation Desert Storm

Information from before the Gulf War generated serious concern among Coalition forces about Iraq's possible use of Scuds armed with chemical or biological warheads. Pre-war intelligence judged that Iraq might have chemical warheads for Scuds.[17] One source said that despite very unstable flight characteristics, Iraq successfully completed development of a Scud with a chemical warhead in 1990, and that Iraq had stockpiled 150 Scuds with chemical warheads.[18] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) judged that these warheads would most likely contain persistent chemical warfare agents such as VX (nerve agent) or mustard (blister agent).[19] However, another report quotes an Iraqi engineer who claimed to have worked on the Al Hussein and Al Abbas missile programs. This engineer stated that Iraq still had not succeeded in manufacturing chemical warheads for its ballistic missiles and that Saddam Hussein's threat to launch Scuds with chemical warheads at Israel was "a mere poker game."[20]

According to an intelligence source, the Al Hussein missile could carry either chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) warheads. Iraq could mount a biological agent warhead on the Al Abbas version of the Scud. This source reported Iraq planned to use cholera for biological warfare against targets in the Gulf region (but weaponization of cholera could not be verified later).[21]

Intelligence agencies may have put less emphasis on Scuds as a biological threat, but they considered that threat real. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed:

We have no information to confirm that Iraq has developed or manufactured BW warheads for its ballistic missiles. However, Iraq has the ability to weaponize its BW agents'including anthrax spores'and we believe it is well within Iraq's technical capabilities to produce BW warheads for its Scud missiles'. It probably would take only one BW warhead to neutralize any one given target. Our analysis indicates that the Al Husayn [alternate spelling], carrying about 100 kilograms (KG) of dried anthrax spores, would theoretically produce a maximum area of lethal contamination of 1,600 square kilometers [579 square miles]. That would be a dispersion area about 90 KM long and 15 KM wide at the widest point [56 by 9 miles]. Other of Iraq's BW agents would be equally potent: Botulinus toxin would produce a maximum lethal area of contamination of about 21 square kilometers [8 square miles] and anthrax spores in solution would produce an area of about 110 square kilometers [42 square miles].' Iraq only needs a few BW-tipped missiles in its stockpile to cause significant casualties.[22]

Another CIA document stated:

If Saddam concluded his personal position was becoming hopeless, this could convince him to use biological weapons to shock the Coalition into a cease-fire. In such a situation, the use of anthrax against a coalition military installation or a major Saudi oil facility might seem an attractive option.' Iraq is almost certain to use chemical weapons tactically to avoid serious battlefield defeats.[23]

B.  Information During the War

After Iraq began its Scud attacks, Coalition forces saw reports suggesting the possibility of imminent attacks by Iraq with chemically or biologically armed Scuds. The first Scud attack on Israel occurred on January 18, 1991, the day after the Coalition began offensive air operations. An 82nd Airborne Division log sheet noted at 5:32 AM on January 18th that "Israelis have informed the United States that at least some of the missiles that impacted were chemical rds [rounds]."[24] We could not determine who initiated this report, and shortly after 6:00 AM a retraction was transmitted.[25] Israeli officials confirmed to the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses that none of the Scuds that attacked Israel carried chemical or biological agent warheads.[26]

As the Coalition air campaign proceeded, a VII Corps log included an entry at 8:00 PM on January 20th noting that "a source of unknown reliability" stated that Saddam had ordered a chemical/biological attack for the following day.[27] The XVIII Airborne Corps advised the 82nd Airborne Division intelligence staff several hours later that a chemical (or biological) attack would most likely come by surface-to-surface missiles and estimated the likelihood of such an attack at 50 percent.[28]

On January 27, 1991, another report stated that Saddam Hussein had ordered the beginning of chemical attacks.[29] The CIA noted that Iraq's forces "would be 'virtually certain' to use chemical weapons if they were pushed back by an Allied offensive."[30] As the Coalition ground campaign began, the DIA assessed that "Baghdad may be tempted to launch non-conventional [i.e., chemical or biological warfare agent] attacks with whatever warheads are available."[31]

However, the expected chemical or biological attacks did not materialize. Even before the Gulf War ended, media reporting indicated Iraq had used no such weapons aboard Scuds. As one newspaper article noted, "Speculation that Iraq also would fit chemical warheads atop longer-range Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas missiles have [sic] not been borne out by the 67 firings so far of these missiles on civilian and military targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. This fact has caused some officials to conclude that Iraq still lacks the capability of placing chemical warheads on the longer-range Scuds."[32]

Intelligence suggested one possible reason no chemical or biological warfare attacks had occurred. The CIA reported in January 1991 that, while Iraq had chemical warheads for Scud missiles, it had not yet mastered the fuse technology and trigger mechanism to detonate the warhead. The same report stated that Iraq's missile officials were considering having Scud missiles deliver chemical or biological weapons, counting on Patriot missiles to intercept the Scuds, thus dispersing the agent and contaminating an estimated 60 square kilometers (23 square miles).[33] Such a concept suggested that Iraq knew that their own Scud contact fusing could not do a good job, although an area would still be contaminated. As a United States government assessment indicated at the time, analysts did not expect a Patriot intercept to increase dissemination of agent, and it might greatly reduce such dissemination.[34]

The Armed Forces Journal International magazine also reflected upon the technical challenges involved in arming Scuds with chemical warfare payloads:

Why have not Iraqi Scud chemical warheads appeared? Though there are reliable reports that the Iraqis have tested such warheads, technological challenges in the design of such warheads are more formidable than most reports have suggested'. The main hurdle in chemical warhead design is the missile's high terminal speed, nearly one mile per second. For a chemical warhead to function properly, it must dispense the liquid agent into an aerosol cloud a fraction of a second before impact. This is accomplished using a proximity fuse in the nose of the warhead detonating a burster charge in its base. The fuse must withstand the substantial heat build-up, shock, and vibration of descent. The burster charge must be sufficient to breach the warhead casing without destroying the small load of toxic liquid. If either device fails, the warhead plunges into the ground and the chemical agent is largely destroyed or absorbed.[35]

The United States Air Force's Tactical Air Command speculated in early March 1991 that

Iraq well may have refrained from employing chemical agents for political and tactical reasons including inadequate targeting and intelligence and adverse weather. In addition, the tempo and magnitude of the coalition campaign kept Baghdad off balance, and Saddam and his generals may not have wanted to risk the expected massive retaliation for a minimal tactical advantage.[36]

C.  Post-War Findings

A declassified DIA document reported that a thorough analysis of each Scud impact point in at least the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) area uncovered no evidence of chemical warfare agents or their decomposition products.[37] We did not find any indication of verified detection of chemical warfare agents in any other Scud impact areas, including Israel where officials confirmed all Scud warheads recovered were conventional.[38]

In accepting United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, Iraq agreed to a cease-fire, intrusive inspections, and elimination of their weapons of mass destruction and related materiel including Scuds. To perform the inspections and monitor Iraq's compliance with the agreement, the United Nations created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).[39]

After the Gulf War, publicly-released UNSCOM information, as well as the United States intelligence community's independent information collection and analysis, provided insight regarding Iraq's ability to field Scuds fitted with chemical and biological warfare agent warheads. From such sources, we gained perspective on what the Coalition might have faced had Iraq possessed and used workable Scuds with such warheads. UNSCOM verified that Iraq produced 50 chemical and 25 biological Scud warheads that could have been filled for field-operations. Iraq also produced five warheads specifically designed for trials of chemical warfare agents. Of the 50 chemical warfare agent warheads, 16 were filled with the nerve agent sarin and 34 were filled with binary components (chemicals that mix and produce sarin nerve agent) or the persistent nerve agent VX.  UNSCOM did not identify the biological agents.[40]

In 1995, Iraq admitted to UNSCOM inspectors that it had produced the biological warfare agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.[41] Inspectors found that Iraq had launched a crash program in December 1990 to field weapons with BW agents to include artillery shells and some Al Hussein Scuds. Iraq claimed they never used such weapons because the United States sent them a message implying that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, the United States would counterattack with nuclear weapons. According to Iraq, Israeli officials sent a similar message.[42]

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons against Coalition forces in the Gulf War.[43] For example, Near East South Asia (NESA), a CIA office focused on the Middle East and other areas, thoroughly searched their files regarding potential use of chemical warfare (CW) of biological warfare (BW) agents by Iraq during the Gulf War. They summarized the results as follows: 1) They found no evidence that Iraq's leaders ordered chemical or biological warfare agent use during the Gulf War and no conclusive evidence that Iraq's forces employed those weapons; 2) Iraq had some Scud missile warheads loaded with CW and BW agents, and that Iraq planned to retaliate with CW and BW weapons for a nuclear attack on Baghdad; and 3) Husayn Kamil (Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law and former chief of Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical weapons development who defected to the west) stated in August 1995 that Iraq's officials believed that the United States would respond with tactical nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the Coalition.[44] This summary suggests that Iraq did not employ CW or BW weapons against Coalition forces.

We have assembled in Tab C excerpts from operational reports regarding chemical agent testing and any symptoms (or lack thereof) for the Scud incidents in the Kuwait theater of operations discussed in Section V below. Reporting on this issue demonstrates that Iraq did not arm Scuds launched against Coalition forces with chemical warheads.

 

V. IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

A. Introduction

Support for this Information Paper came from hundreds of pages of operational and open source evidence, allowing investigators to piece together lists of Iraq's Scud firings (presented below by general target area). Source documents sometimes contained inconsistent information. Even official logs and chronologies frequently recorded disparate detail and third-hand accounts. While a large volume of contemporary 1991 operational reporting has been declassified or released, some of the most reliable sources of information on Scud firings contain sensitive details and remain classified. Investigators considered all available information in constructing summaries for each attack. For completeness, however, our summaries below cite reports with alternative information on numbers of Scuds in an attack, Patriot defensive reactions, ground damage, and other details. For some operational logs and chronologies we uncovered only individual pages detached at some point and set aside because they touched on Scuds. In some cases, we could not identify the originating military organization, but all such evidence came from archives of official documents that the services reviewed for use in this paper.

The brief summaries that follow integrate what we know regarding Scuds fired at targets in the KTO and against Israel. The map in Figure 2 plots generalized launch locations in Iraq, impact areas in the KTO and Israel, and approximate maximum range of Scuds from the launch areas.[45]

fig2s.gif (10738 bytes)

Figure 2.  Scud launch areas, target regions, and Al Hussein range

We have converted all times to local date and time in the KTO.[46]

In the rest of this section we first discuss the total number of Scud missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel during the Gulf War. Available counts vary. We follow this with separate coverage of the Scud attacks in four geographic regions: the eastern KTO, the Riyadh area, the region of KKMC and Hafir Al Batin, and finally Israel. We summarize in tables the Scud strikes against each KTO region and follow the tables with a few more detailed accounts of the most significant incidents.

B. Total Scud Firing Incidents

At one of our veterans' outreach programs in 1998, a veteran questioned the number of Scud missiles fired against Coalition forces during the Gulf War. He based his opinions on an internal working document produced by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) and provided by that Department of Defense organization to some veterans. The listing had 179 incident entries totaling 344 missiles. A junior officer of the Center had compiled a list of Scud launch information from hundreds of operational reports, many with inconsistent data. Not knowing which accounts were correct, this officer included all versions of what happened. CURR designed the list to serve as a reference for responding to veterans' communications regarding Scud incidents at particular times. Our research and analysis confirmed that Iraq fired 46 Scuds into the KTO. The rest of the entries in the CURR list involve duplicate reporting or other incorrect information. We have included the CURR compilation and our analysis of it in Tab D. The operational documents that CURR used as sources for their summary we used in preparing this information paper. Many of these documents were not previously available.

After the Gulf War, various authors and government agencies published assessments of Iraq's Scud attacks including the numbers of missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel. Pieced together from differing data sets, the totals varied generally within a narrow range. Table 2 summarizes the data from selected authors and organizations. The United States Space Command's count of 97 launches includes nine more than the 88 missiles our investigation determined struck Coalition countries and in or near Israel. Some of the sources cited in Table 2 noted several early in-flight failures that could explain this difference. In reassessing unclassified or declassified material on individual attacks, we can now account for the 46 Scuds that attacked the KTO but only 41 of the 42 Scuds that struck in or near Israel (for a total of 87). However, based on all available information, including classified documents, we are confident that a total of 88 missiles struck in or near the KTO and Israel.  In the summaries that follow we break out the 87 firing incidents covered in unclassified or declassified documents by general area attacked (the eastern KTO, Riyadh, KKMC/Hafir Al Batin, and Israel). These incidents are summarized in Figure 3.[47] After an initial period of intense daily attacks, the number of missiles launched against the Coalition and Israel per day fell off substantially.

Table 2. Number of missiles fired by source

Source

Atk'd KTO

Atk'd Israel

Total Attacks

Remarks

Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses[48]

46

42

88

Case Narrative ' "Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia"
Department of Defense Report to Congress[49]

N/A

N/A

88

Published in April 1992.
Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center[50]

45

40

85

Disseminated on February 27, 1991, just before the ceasefire.
Iraq, as reported to United Nations Special Commission[51]

51

43

93

Further details are not in the public domain, but Iraq's launch information agreed well with other sources (with a few exceptions).
United States Space Command[52]

N/A

N/A

97

Based on Defense Support Program infrared satellite data on launches (rather than impacts in target areas).
Center for International Studies[53]

42

39

81

Plus 5-8 that failed shortly after launch.
Military Lessons of the Gulf War[54]

46

40

86

A book published after the war in 1991.
Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review [55]

46

40

86

Plus "five missiles believed to have broken up immediately after launch and did not reach Saudi Arabia or Israel."

 

fig3s.gif (6358 bytes)

Figure 3.  Scud attacks by target area

During the war, some intelligence estimates concluded that Iraq fired Al Abbas missiles with an even greater estimated range than the Al Hussein. Authorities later determined that Iraq fired only the Al Hussein extended range missile except for five attacks with the Al Hijarah variant.[56]

The KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area did not get targeted until the later stages of the Scud attacks. At the end of the war, Iraq fired several Scuds toward Bahrain and Qatar in the eastern KTO (See the regional summaries in Sections C and E below.)

Because many Scuds broke up as they reentered the denser atmosphere, and Patriots intercepted others, some observers might believe a single missile attack included more missiles than was the case. Also, the kinetic energy of heavy debris striking the ground at about 3,600 miles per hour (one mile per second) could cause a significant crater.[57] Both the heavy warhead and engine sections sometimes separated from either end of the missile body on reentry. In these instances, the large but now significantly lighter missile body could decelerate enough from air resistance to survive impact almost intact, as several did.[58]

C. Scud Incidents in the Eastern KTO

Below we address Scud attacks in the Eastern KTO. In this section and those that follow, we summarize the nature of attacks in table entries, including the best available information on the number of attacking missiles. We also note alternative missile numbers we determined were inaccurate but that appeared somewhere in operational reporting (alternative reporting or "alt rpts" numbers in the fourth column). We follow the tables with more detailed accounts of a few incidents chosen because of potential veteran interest or operational significance. Often, many unit logs, chronologies, and summaries recorded the same Scud attack. In such cases we cite only representative and substantive samples for practical reasons. However, we reviewed all cited references as different documents often contained additional data that could provide a more complete picture of the incidents.

1.  Summary

Evidence indicates that Iraq fired 19 Scuds against the areas of Dhahran, Al Jubayl, Bahrain, and Qatar. Table 3 summarizes the details and describes each event.

Table 3. Scud attacks against Eastern KTO

Event #

Date (1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks (MULTIPLE PAGE TABLE)

1

Jan 20

9:43 PM

2 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Some sources reported three Scuds. Chemical alarms went off, tests were negative. Patriots claimed 2 kills. MOPP Level 4 (see Tab A) was in effect for six to seven hours. Debris and two impacts found. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

2

Jan 21

12:29 AM

2 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Patriots claimed one kill, let other hit water. Debris hit runway at Dhahran International Airport, outside an aircraft bunker, and other areas.[59]

3

Jan 21

10:18 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Al Jubayl

No Patriot engagement.[60] Target may have been Dhahran.

4

Jan 22

7:10 AM

3 (alt rpts 4)

Dhahran

Scuds one and two were not engaged and hit outside of town. Scud three was intercepted by Patriots and landed off Qatar. Debris hit Dhahran area. Most chemical warfare agent tests were negative. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

5

Jan 23

10:54 PM

2 (alt rpts 3-5)

Dhahran

Iraq rapidly fired five Scuds ' one at Israel and two each at Dhahran and Riyadh. Of the two Scuds fired at Dhahran, Patriots intercepted at least one. Debris fell within and just outside United States occupied base.[61]

6

Jan 26

3:28 AM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Dhahran

Successful Patriot engagement reported. Debris hit Dhahran International Airport.[62]

7

Feb 16

2:01 AM

1

Al Jubayl

Patriot down for maintenance ' no engagement. Scud broke up over harbor and hit the water near ammunition pier. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

8

Feb 22

2:31 AM

3 (alt rpts 1-2)

Bahrain

First time targeted. Patriot battery on Bahrain engaged one Scud and debris was found. Other two Scuds were out of defended area.[63]

9

Feb 23

4:59 AM

2 (alt rpts 1, 4)

Dhahran

Scud one had non-threatening trajectory, and Patriots did not engage it. It landed 12 miles north of King Fahd International Airport. Scud two broke up in flight.[64]

10

Feb 25

8:32 PM

1 (alt rpts 3)

Dhahran

Of two Patriot batteries in range, one was non-operational and other did not detect Scud because of software problem. Warhead hit United States barracks killing 28 and injuring over 100. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

11

Feb 26

1:26 AM

1 (alt rpts 3)

Qatar

Scud overflew Dhahran headed for Qatar. No Patriot engaged because it was out of defense zone. Scud fell into Gulf 40 miles off Doha, Qatar.[65]

 

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  January 20th Attack on Dhahran (Event 1 in Table 3)

Shortly before 10 PM on January 20th, Iraq fired the first two Scuds at the Dhahran area.[66] One report noted that Patriot units fired five missiles at three (rather than the actual two) Scuds and that M8 chemical agent alarms went off, but subsequent tests proved negative.[67] A separate United States Air Force unit at Dhahran logged an entry at 9:50 PM noting multiple explosions. Checks revealed that none of that unit's chemical agent detectors had alarmed. A later entry reported a possible impact near a barracks and the United States Army Component United States Central Command headquarters as well as near a Saudi police camp and the port area. Subsequent investigation turned up no building damage, casualties, or unexploded ordnance.[68] A witness to the January 20th attack remembered that a Patriot battery took out the Scuds near a pier in Dhahran and that everybody went to MOPP Level 4 (full chemical protection ' see glossary at Tab A) for about six or seven hours while tests and assessments were made. He did not know the test results, but an "all clear" was sounded permitting a termination of the chemical alert.[69] A chemical company soldier remembered witnessing repeated M8A1 chemical agent alarms and positive M256 chemical detection kit tests the first night of Scud attacks in the Dhahran area and recalls remaining in MOPP Level 4 for seven hours. He believed no one had chemical agent symptoms.[70]

b.  January 22nd Attack on Dhahran (Event 4 in Table 3)

Shortly after 7:00 AM on January 22nd, Iraq fired three Scuds toward Dhahran. The first two flew outside of the Patriots' defended area with at least one landing in the desert about 50 miles west of town. The other reportedly went down in Gulf waters north of Qatar. Most unclassified sources credit Patriots with intercepting the third Scud.[71] Debris reportedly struck on a Dhahran Air Base runway just as an aircraft took off to the south, but the aircraft apparently escaped damage.[72] Most pieces of debris were described as small (less than 3 inches), but something falling out of the sky caused a crater 23 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep on the air base. All but one field test indicated no presence of chemical warfare agent. In that one positive chemical warfare agent test, a chemical agent monitor registered a very low concentration on the nerve agent scale. Subsequent testing at that location proved negative.[73] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle (see glossary at Tab A) took samples from the crater area for additional testing, but we found no specific results of any Fox tests.

Alternative reporting included a fourth Scud that appeared in some chronologies at this time as a target for two Patriot launches. However, this track represented a false target (radar interference ' see Section VI.B). One summary suggested that Patriot units fired two missiles at each of three Scuds.[74]

c.  February 16th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3)

Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16th.[75] The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud.[76] The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile's impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier.[77] Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.

fig4s.gif (21716 bytes)

Figure 4.  Map of Jubayl harbor Scud impact

One witness recalls hearing a loud explosion and seeing white-hot objects falling.[78] The Scud caused no casualties or damage, but it exuded a blue, green, and yellow substance and bubbled a strong-smelling gas for some time (probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid ' see Section VII). United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialists eventually recovered the missile in parts using divers, flotation bags, and a crane. Test results performed on this Scud determined that it did not have a chemical or biological warhead.[79] Figure 5 shows the recovered high explosive warhead.[80]

fig5s.gif (10077 bytes)

Figure 5.   Recovered Scud warhead

d.  February 25th Attack on Dhahran (Event 10 in Table 3)

Iraq launched one Scud toward Dhahran early in the evening of February 25th. One Patriot battery on Dhahran airfield was not operational and another nearby did not track the Scud, apparently because of a software problem.[81] The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The strong explosion and resulting fire killed 28 United States soldiers from the 475th Quartermaster Group (a United States Army Reserve unit) and injured 100, about half of them seriously. According to one source, most of the injured suffered burns. Initially, some 40 soldiers were believed missing.[82] Most of the soldiers in the warehouse had just arrived and had not completely processed into their units. This, plus the presence of their personnel files and computer records in the same devastated warehouse, played havoc with the ability to account for people.[83] Helicopters eventually evacuated 70 to 100 soldiers to six hospitals including five Saudi facilities.[84] This single incident caused more combat casualties than any other in Operation Desert Storm.[85]

Some documentation includes alternative details to this horrific event. One message stated that this incident involved three confirmed launches (one against Dhahran, one against nearby King Fahd Airport and one against Qatar).[86] A press briefing attributed the lack of Patriot engagement to a combination of the warehouse location (housing) and debris trajectory from a disintegrating Scud.[87] The media quoted another senior officer as explaining that "because it [the Scud] had gone into a tumble ' it wasn't within the parameters of where it would be attacked by our missile defense system."[88]

D. Scud Incidents in the Riyadh Area

1. Summary

Investigators counted 18 Scuds fired against the area of Riyadh during Iraq's missile attacks. Table 4 and the details on selected incidents that follow address these attacks.

Table 4. Scud attacks against Riyadh area

Event #

Date

(1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks

(MULTIPLE PAGE TABLE)

12

Jan 21

12:42 AM

4

(alt rpts 6-17)

Riyadh

Scud attack on Riyadh coordinated with one against Dhahran (see Event 2 in Table 3). Patriot units in area fired 26 missiles and claimed all Scuds killed. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

13

Jan 22

3:41 AM

3

(alt rpts 2-9)

Riyadh

Patriots engaged and possibly intercepted all three (30 Patriots fired). Debris noted south of town. TV coverage showed three ground explosions in area. Nearly intact Scud body (minus warhead and tail section) landed on a street. No casualties or damage.[89]

14

Jan 23

10:54 PM

2 (alt rpts 3-5)

Riyadh

Iraq fired five Scuds in a very short time ' one at Israel and two each at Dhahran and Riyadh. In Riyadh, Patriots reportedly destroyed one or both. During this period, Patriots at KKMC fired at one false target and Patriots with VII Corps fired at two false targets.[90]

15

Jan 25

10:23 PM

2

(alt rpts 3-5)

Riyadh

Patriots intercepted with two missiles against each Scud. However, one Scud warhead demolished a six-story Saudi Department of Interior building killing one and injuring 30. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

16

Jan 26

10:46 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots engaged Scud. Warhead exploded in empty field ¼ mile from United States Central Command Headquarters.[91]

17

Jan 28

8:55 PM

1

(alt rpts 3)

Riyadh

Patriots fired four missiles ' one intercepted the Scud and the others engaged debris. Debris struck farm in suburbs with no significant damage.[92]

18

Feb 3

12:41 AM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots fired two missiles, but Scud warhead detonated near apartment damaging several buildings and slightly injuring 29 people. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

19

Feb 8

1:54 AM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

One of two Patriots fired reportedly intercepted this Scud north of city. However, warhead hit parking lot and detonated. No casualties or major damage. Patriots considered this a "mission kill"[93] (see glossary in Tab A).

20

Feb 11

10:20 PM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

One of two Patriots intercepted, but warhead hit near swimming pool and building at Islamic University. It exploded causing significant damage. It broke many windows and slightly injured two people by flying glass. Considered Patriot "mission kill."[94]

21

Feb 24

4:32 AM

1

Riyadh

Two patriots fired and warhead kill claimed (it landed without exploding), but minor damage caused to Saudi school (no injuries).[95]

22

Feb 24

9:23 PM

1

(alt rpts 2)

Riyadh

Patriots fired two with one malfunction and command destruct. Other Patriot engaged Scud with "mission kill" reported. Scud broke up before or as result of intercept. No explosion from debris.[96]

 

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  January 21st Attack on Riyadh (Event 12 in Table 4)

Shortly after midnight and within a few minutes of an attack against Dhahran (Event 2 in Table 3), Iraq launched four Scuds in the first attack on the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Patriot batteries in the area launched 26 missiles (eight at the first Scud and six at each that followed) recording kills against all targets.[97] One report noted the Patriots claimed 14 kills at Riyadh and Dhahran combined "'because [Patriot] missiles went after [Patriot] missiles."[98] A log entry suggested that some Patriots fired on fragments from missile intercepts.[99] News media videotapes reportedly captured three ground explosions. One of the ground explosions near an office building blew out the back wall of one structure and produced a 10-foot crater. Twelve people had minor injuries.[100]

As in other Scud events, some logs reported a larger number of separate Scuds fired than we could confirm in our analysis of all available evidence.[101]

b.  January 25th Attack on Riyadh (Event 15 in Table 4)

Late in the evening of January 25th, Iraq fired two Scud missiles toward Riyadh. Patriot batteries fired four missiles, reportedly intercepting both Scuds.[102] However, one of the Scud warheads completely demolished a six-story Saudi Department of Interior building in downtown Riyadh killing one Saudi and injuring 30 (most slightly). The warhead struck only a little over a mile south of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation building housing United States Central Command Headquarters.[103] At this building, communications technicians reported hearing a "loud boom" from above. They investigated the roof and found debris from the Scud. Nuclear-biological-chemical specialists who were called to the scene to test for chemical agents did not find any contamination and gave an "all clear."[104]

Although other sources reported three or five Scuds heading toward Riyadh,[105] available evidence points to only two Scuds.

c.  February 3rd Attack on Riyadh (Event 18 in Table 4)

After almost five days of no strikes on the KTO, Iraq resumed Scud attacks with a single launch against Riyadh very early on February 3rd.[106] A Patriot battery fired two missiles[107] but apparently failed to disable the Scud warhead, which detonated damaging several buildings and slightly injuring 29 people.[108]

One report suggested Iraq launched a second Scud shortly after the first; however, the available evidence does not support this account.[109]

Two other sources recorded a successful intercept of the Scud. They stated that the engagement resulted in a mission kill (meaning a Patriot missile deflected the Scud from defended territory or the Scud warhead had significantly reduced effectiveness) and that the warhead hit in the desert east of Riyadh air base.[110] However, the damage and casualties in a populated area noted above attests that at least the warhead struck within the city. We found no evidence concerning chemical warfare agent testing for this event.

E. Scud Incidents in the KKMC and Hafir Al Batin Areas

1.  Summary

Iraq targeted King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and the area around Hafir Al Batin with an estimated nine Scuds beginning in mid-February. See Table 5.

2.  Details on Selected Incidents

a.  February 14th Attack on Hafir Al Batin (Event 23 in Table 5)

On February 14, 1991, Iraq fired a barrage of Scud missiles in what was the first attack against the general KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area as well as the first attack against a military target in the middle of the day. The attack against Hafir Al Batin involved at least two Scuds and two different launch locations.[111] Patriot radars near KKMC tracked the Scuds, but because the missiles threatened an area outside the batteries' designated defense zone and range, the crews launched no Patriot missiles against these Scuds.[112] One Scud reportedly exploded in the southeast part of Hafir Al Batin collapsing the side of one house, stripping off the façade of another, and destroying an automobile maintenance workshop along with four or five cars.[113] Another Scud struck in a civilian district, but damage involved only broken windows. These missiles caused four minor injuries.[114]

Table 5. Scud attacks against KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area

Event #

Date (1991)

Time (Local)

# Scuds (Best est.)

Impact Area

Remarks

23

Feb 14

11:45 AM

Poss 5 (alt rpts 2, 3, 4)

Hafir Al Batin

First attack on this area and first in middle of day. Number of missiles unclear in evidence. Five impact areas reported, but most sources noted two Scuds that broke up. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

24

Feb 21

5:06 PM

2 (alt rpts 3)

KKMC

Seven Patriots fired, intercepting one or both Scuds (one Scud reportedly disintegrated on its own). No damage or casualties reported.[115]

25

Feb 21

9:00 PM

1

KKMC

Projected impact 12 miles north of city so Patriots did not engage. No casualties or damage. See Details on Selected Incidents below.

26

Feb 24

12:17 PM

1 (alt rpts 2)

KKMC

Patriot intercepted one missile. No casualties or damage reported. Second impact of debris recorded. Several sources incorrectly reported another Scud overflying.[116]

 

One log contained plots of five impacts for these attacks, but did not indicate which involved warheads (and hence separate missiles) and which might have resulted from debris. Three impacts happened close to the town and two at some distance to the south and to the east. The log suggested that the additional impacts resulted from one Scud breaking up in flight.[117] Other reports noted that local eyewitnesses claimed a Scud broke up after another Scud missile or a Patriot hit it.[118] An official United States Air Force post-war assessment noted five Scud launches on the 14th.[119] Another Scud-tracking organization listed four launches on February 14th. Scuds struck no other target area on this date.[120] A nuclear-biological-chemical operations summary stated that one Scud in this attack had an airburst suspected of involving a chemical agent warhead. Units did both ground and aerial surveys. Reports did not indicate how the air survey was conducted, but part of the ground survey included use of a Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle. The report noted that no contamination was found and that the air burst really involved the Scud breaking up in flight.[121]

Other reporting typifies the variety of accounts that surrounded Scud attacks. From reports that all of the impacts occurred in unoccupied desert areas (but there were casualties and damage in town) to accounts that witnesses saw three air bursts near the town with a warhead separating from one of the missiles (the only report noting three air bursts),[122] unclassified documentation clearly does not present a consistent picture regarding how many missiles were involved in this attack. Based on all available evidence, however, we assess that five separate Scuds struck in the area.

b.  February 21st Attack on KKMC (Event 25 in Table 5)

Iraq launched this attack from the Baghdad area toward KKMC at about 9:00 PM.[123] Missile impact was expected about 12 miles north of the city.[124] However, the missile disintegrated prior to impact, and witnesses observed an air burst. All but two reports indicated Patriots defending the KKMC area did not attempt to engage the Scud.[125] Research revealed no indications of casualties or damage, but one source reported that debris fell in Trailer City, a temporary United States housing area. A United States airman in the housing area remembered the debris falling around him but recalled no injuries.[126]

F.  Scud Incidents in Israel

Iraq fired 42 Scuds that reached Israel or nearby areas of Jordan beginning on January 18, 1991. Iraq launched these missiles from Western Iraq against three general target areas ' Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the Negev Desert in Southern Israel, specifically, Dimona where Israel had a nuclear facility.[127] Figure 6 summarizes the general impact areas for these strikes. Those hitting in the West Bank of Jordan presumably fell short of their intended targets in Israel proper.[128]

fig6s.gif (2929 bytes)

Figure 6.  Where Scuds landed in or near Israel

As noted in Section V, the director of Israel's Scud Recovery Unit indicated none of the missile warheads they recovered had chemical or biological warfare agent components. All had conventional warheads.[129]

The director of the Israeli Scud Recovery Unit also noted that when Patriots shot down a Scud, release of the residual rocket oxidizer (inhibited red fuming nitric acid) generated a cloud of yellow mist that caused burning sensations on exposed skin. Some who experienced Scud attacks incorrectly believed this yellow or orange cloud to be nerve agent.[130] See Section VII on Scud oxidizer incidents.

 

VI. FALSE ALARMS AND FALSE TARGETS

Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations responded not only to actual Scud launches but also to many false reports of Scud attacks generated by early warning surveillance assets, intelligence reports, or because Patriots fired at false targets.

A. False Alarms

After a thorough review of ballistic missile incident accounts from Operation Desert Storm, we determined that at least 60 false alarms were logged in the KTO[131] (in addition to the Patriot false target detections addressed separately below). None of these 60 alarms documented an actual missile attack, but they may have created the impression that such attacks occurred more frequently than was the case. Even though many of these alerts were cancelled within minutes, many servicemembers and civilians took appropriate measures, donned chemical protective gear, and sought shelter. We believe (because alerts were canceled promptly) that misinterpretation of initial infrared (heat-source) detections by satellites led to most of these false alarms. At least two other false alarms came from detection of signals from a radar associated with Scud operations (it tracks weather balloons to determine winds aloft).

The United States operations, intelligence, and space communities collectively made history when they developed a system to provide warning of Iraq's ballistic missile launches to the entire KTO (and Israel) within minutes.[132] This system relied primarily on space-based infrared surveillance. However, across any combat theater, there are many non-missile infrared sources including exploding bombs, high intensity flares, demolitions of weapons storage sites, and other sudden heat-producing events capable of registering on infrared-sensitive devices. Because warning time was at a premium, some early alerts proved false, but the goal was always to notify quickly to protect lives.[133]

On January 17th, the day the air campaign began, a Scud warning shortly after 4:00 AM put many bases and units in the Dhahran area into MOPP Level 3 (full protective gear except gloves ' see glossary in Tab A).[134] Reports even noted confirmed missile impacts in the area[135] and Scud fragments collected.[136] The warning was eventually cancelled.[137]

A mobile Army surgical hospital (MASH) chronology includes the following for January 17th:

The 807th MASH has entered the war, and suddenly loudspeakers begin to blare, "SCUD alert ' MOPP level four" ' we all scurry into our MOPP gear ' The lights are out, now, and we have been previously informed that the Saudis think a SCUD can only penetrate the top two floors of our building. In total darkness, punctuated only by the red-lensed flashlight beams, all 250 members of the 807th troop down three flights of stairs. As we occupy the empty apartments, each person sits on the floor, alone inside his mask except for his or her thoughts and fears. For 2 long hours we breathe claustrophobic air in hot chemical suits, until, with dawn, we hear, "ALL CLEAR, MOPP level zero." ' We later find out that radar confused our own returning B-52's with Scuds. Fortunately, we learn that after the war has ended.[138]

Figure 7 summarizes the false alarms during Operation Desert Storm. These false alarms declined in frequency after the first eight days of the war. The decline possibly reflected refined human judgment or adjustments in procedures. In addition to the detections graphed, United States Space Command generated five false alarms from December 25-30, 1990, three the result of live ballistic missile test firings by Iraq.[139]

fig7s.gif (5224 bytes)

Figure 7.  False alarms during Operation Desert Storm

B. Patriot False Target Detections

According to information published after the Gulf War, a problem with the Patriot radar system caused Patriot missiles to fire at phantom targets. In September 1992, an Army official admitted that electronic signals, or noise, emitted by a variety of United States systems caused computer problems and accidentally launched Patriot missiles in the first week of the war. The Patriot's radar system processed these signals as the result of software flaws and a design that left the back of the radar unit open to stray signals. These signals came from the airborne warning and control system aircraft, radar jamming pods on fighters, test equipment, airport radars, and communications systems. Software changes and makeshift shrouds for the backs of Patriot radars eventually resolved the problem.[140] During the early stages of the air war that began on January 17, computers automatically directed the Patriot missile batteries' threat responses. Soldiers in Patriot units did not have a role in the fire, no-fire decisions. Patriot units later revised the procedures, and changed to a manual mode of engagement that allowed operators to decide when to fire.[141]

The first actual ballistic missile attack against the KTO occurred against the Dhahran area at 9:43 PM on January 20, 1991. However, false targets involving Patriot reactions began on January 18, 1991, without warnings from national surveillance assets. Veterans aware of these engagements believed, at least at the time, that incoming missiles threatened them. Most reports did not identify the January 18th incidents as reactions to Patriot false targets until after the war when the discrepancy became public knowledge. For example, during the war, one Army document noted for the 18th that Patriots intercepted a single Scud in the Dhahran area.[142] Alpha Battery, 2nd Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery got credit for a first successful Scud intercept. An element of the XVIII Airborne Corps reported seeing a Scud missile heading south. Three powerful explosions occurred over Dhahran Air Base. This report claimed that three missiles had been fired at Dhahran. The same document indicated that Patriots engaged one incoming missile but that another hit Khobar, an area where United States forces were billeted. The entire Dhahran area was reported at MOPP Level four with lower MOPP levels ordered further west.[143] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle searched for evidence of chemical warfare agent but found none.[144] One chronology stated that the explosions happened when a friendly aircraft released bombs into an ordnance jettison area.[145] We found only one contemporaneous record that indicated (correctly) that the reports of ballistic missiles launched at Dhahran on the 18th were erroneous.[146]

Despite the flurry of Patriot false targets early in the war (some interspersed with real attacks), we found no evidence that Patriots engaged false targets after January 23, 1991 (presumably because of the equipment and software fixes). Figure 8 shows how the 20 false target detections break down by day based on research of unclassified and declassified operational reporting.[147] Patriots did not launch missiles at every false target, but one report indicated that Patriot batteries fired a total of 22 missiles at false targets. In another report, an official admitted that the number was 24.[148]

fig8s.gif (5500 bytes)

Figure 8.  False Patriot detections by date

 

VII. SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS

As Israeli officials pointed out to us, when reentering Scuds were intercepted or broke up on their own, they sometimes released a yellow-to-reddish-to-brownish cloud of the Scud's residual propellant oxidizer. People on the ground observing these clouds voiced concerns that the airborne releases involved chemical warfare agent. Incoming Al Hussein missiles contained about 300 pounds of residual oxidizer and 100 pounds of fuel. The oxidizer and accompanying oxides of nitrogen were dangerous in their own right and caused a range of symptoms in people exposed on the ground.[149]

Iraq's Scud oxidizer, inhibited red nitric acid (IRFNA), can cause deep and painful burns on the skin or in the lungs. When inhaled, the oxidizer and its nitrogen oxide decomposition products can produce immediate or delayed symptoms including throat dryness, cough, headache, dizziness, anxiety, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, labored breathing, inflammation of the lungs, choking, fluid build-up in the lungs, and suffocation, depending on the extent of exposure.[150] In interviews with our investigators, or during testimony before government panels, Gulf War veterans reported a variety of symptoms consistent with oxidizer exposure. Extracted from their accounts, these symptoms included tearing eyes, runny noses, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sleeplessness, headaches, and blurred vision.[151]  Kerosene, the fuel component of Scud propellants also escaped during breakups. Kerosene is not particularly toxic, even after acute exposure, and is used, for example, as barbecue lighter fluid and in jet fuels.[152]  

Readers wanting additional information on Scud oxidizer should consult our information paper on IRFNA.[153]

 

VIII. COALITION RESPONSE TO SCUD THREAT

The Coalition took strong actions to protect forces and civilians and diminish the impact of Scud attacks. The Coalition considered Scuds a military and psychological threat to their forces, populations, and interests. Scud threat reduction efforts went forward on several fronts and included expanded surveillance and warning, deploying Patriot surface-to-air missiles with some ballistic missile intercept capability, air strikes against production and storage facilities, and attempts to destroy Scud units in the field before or after they launched missiles.[154]

The key component of the Scud alert process was the Defense Support Program surveillance satellites (see Figure 9)[155] that identified launches by detecting the infrared energy from a rocket in powered flight.[156] During Operation Desert Storm, United States Space Command quickly assessed the downlinked infrared detections and rapidly passed alert data to United States Central Command and other allies.[157] According to one source, military radars in the region could track missiles and aid in the extrapolation process to identify potential target areas.[158]

fig9s.gif (12505 bytes)

Figure 9.   DSP surveillance satellite[159]

In another response to the Scud threat, the United States deployed Patriot surface-to-air missile units to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Tab A includes a Patriot system description. Figure 10 summarizes the targets at which post-war analysis determined the Patriots fired.[160]

fig10s.gif (3413 bytes)

Figure 10.  Patriots expended by target area

Part of the Coalition strategy for dealing with Scuds involved pre-planned air strikes against associated production and storage facilities.[161] These strikes were concentrated during the early part of the air campaign.[162]

Another component of United States reaction to protect Coalition forces was Scud hunting. Beginning with the initial Scud attacks against Israel on January 18, 1991, and Saudi Arabia on January 20, 1991, United States forces came under enormous pressure to do something about the immediate Scud threat. Reportedly, the United States leadership in Washington, DC, focused on the potential diplomatic and political fallout from Scuds, while most senior air commanders believed that Scuds "did not represent a particularly credible military threat" (emphasis original). As Air Force Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, commander of the United States Air Force Component United States Central Command observed, the Scud was "a lousy weapon."[163]  

Nevertheless, the Coalition diverted considerable resources to attempt to neutralize Iraq's Scuds. Figure 11 displays in parallel graphs the number of total sorties dedicated to counter-Scud operations of all kinds (right) and the number of Iraq's Scuds attacking the KTO and Israel (left). Day 1 was January 17, 1991, and Day 43 was February 28, 1991.

fig11s.gif (8333 bytes)

Figure 11.   Scuds fired and anti-Scud sorties flown by day[164]

Scud units in the field proved difficult to locate and hit. What became known as "the Great Scud Hunt" had questionable operational effectiveness. As the United States Gulf War Air Power Survey noted, most, and possibly all of the 100 mobile launchers reported struck by Coalition aircraft appeared later to have involved decoys, other vehicles, or other objects that presented Scud-like signatures.[165]

 

IX.  THE RESIDUAL THREAT

The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised.[166] However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:

  • In 1992, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that Iraq retained "perhaps hundreds" of missiles, and his successor estimated the residual force at 100-200 missiles.[167]

  • Israeli sources indicated Iraq may have as many as 100 Scuds of all versions.[168]

  • In 1995, Iraq eventually admitted to the United Nations Special Commission that in 1987 it had begun a full-scale program to indigenously manufacture Al Hussein Scuds largely from scratch and had established specialized factories for this purpose. Iraq planned eventually to produce 1,000 missiles, but it claimed that by January 1991 they had failed to produce a single operational missile.[169]

  • In mid-1996, a general officer defector from Iraq said that he believed Saddam Hussein had retained some 40 Scud-type missiles.[170]

  • By 1996, UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-like missiles indigenously that inspectors could not locate.[171] After UNSCOM unwillingly withdrew from Iraq in 1998, some estimated that Iraq could resume production of Al Hussein missiles within one year.[172]

  • According to a United States government white paper in 1998, Iraq maintained a small force of Scud-type missiles and may have pieced together Scuds by integrating original guidance and control systems it concealed from UNSCOM with parts produced in Iraq.[173]

 

X.  SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:

  • During the Gulf War, Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, almost all of them Al Hussein models, with 46 striking in the KTO and 42 in or near Israel. Several more firings probably resulted in early in-flight failures within Iraq.

  • An internal working paper produced and released to veterans by the Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) included 179 entries appearing to involve approximately 344 missiles. In it, CURR listed each variation in attack detail, however minor, as a separate Scud attack entry. For example, if separate reports covered an attack, one using coordinated universal (Z) time and the other using local time in the KTO (C time - three hours difference) the CURR report generated two entries, one for each time, even if all the other details coincided. The officer that prepared the compilation knew the entries involved duplications, but CURR released the list before they could scrub it to consolidate different reports of the same incident. Our analysis of CURR's incident record revealed massively redundant counting based on various second-hand accounts of individual attacks and included false alarms where Iraq launched no Scuds. When we subtracted these duplications and false alarms, the total number of attacking Scuds very closely matched the counts published by other expert sources. See an accounting of the CURR list at Tab D.

  • Iraq worked to develop extended-range Scud variants capable of delivering both chemical and biological warfare agents. As of early 1991, they had produced and filled such warheads on Scuds. However, the evidence suggests that they could not carry out an effective attack with these weapons because of fusing and flight stability problems.

  • We uncovered no convincing evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological agent warheads at Coalition forces or Israel. Technical problems, threats of retaliation, and risk-benefit considerations may have affected Iraq's decision not to employ them.

  • A substantial proportion of the Al Hussein Scud models spontaneously broke up on reentry, probably due to faulty design and unstable flight characteristics.

  • During disintegration on reentry or impact, some Scuds released a yellow, red, or brown cloud containing corrosive inhibited red fuming nitric acid. Observers sometimes mistakenly believed these releases of oxidizer were releases of chemical warfare agents. While not nearly as toxic as chemical warfare agents, IRFNA and accompanying nitrogen oxide decomposition products can cause, as described previously, distressing symptoms in exposed people.

  • The extended-range Scuds fired by Iraq demonstrated even poorer accuracy than the original Soviet design but had modest success as a terror weapon against large population concentrations. As the Scud attacks progressed and it became apparent that Iraq had used no chemical or biological agent warheads, the missiles became less effective as a terror weapon.

  • Iraq probably retains some Scud-type missiles and may be able to produce more.

 

TAB A ' Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary

This tab provides a listing of acronyms and abbreviations found in this report. Additionally, the Glossary section provides definitions for selected technical terms that are not found in common usage.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADA air defense artillery
ARCENT United States Army Component United States Central Command
BDA battle damage assessment
Bn battalion
BW biological warfare
 
CENTAF United States Air Force Component United States Central Command
CEP circular error probable
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC commander-in-chief
CTOC corps tactical operations center
 
CURR Center for Unit Records Research
CW chemical warfare
CWA chemical warfare agent
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DISUM defense intelligence summary
 
DoD Department of Defense
DS Desert Storm
DSP Defense Support Program
DTG date time group
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
 
Gen general
GPALS Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
HTH calcium hypochlorite
INTSUM intelligence summary
IRFNA inhibited red fuming nitric acid
 
IZ 2-letter shorthand for Iraq
JTF joint task force
KG kilogram
KKMC King Khalid Military City
KTO Kuwait theater of operations
  
MOPP mission oriented protective posture
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NESA (CIA office) Near East South Asia
NBC nuclear biological chemical
OSAGWI Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses
 
Refs references
S2/S-2 intelligence officer or staff
SigOps significant operations
SITREP situation report
SRBM short-range ballistic missile
 
TBM tactical ballistic missile
UDMH unsymmetrical dimethylhydrozine
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
USARCENT United States Army Component United States Central Command
USCINCCENT United States Commander-in-Chief Central Command

 

Glossary

B TIME

The time in the time zone located two time zones east of the time zone centered on the prime meridian. This time zone included Israel.

CEP

Circular error probable. An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected to fall.[174]

C TIME

The time in the time zone located three time zones east of the time zone centered on the prime meridian. This time zone included the KTO.

DSP

Defense Support Program uses a satellite-borne system with infrared detectors to sense heat from missile plumes against the earth background. It detects and reports in real time missile launches, space launches, and nuclear detonations. During Desert Storm, DSP detected the launch of Iraq's Scud missiles and permitted timely warning to civilian populations and coalition forces in Israel and the KTO.[175]

Fox Nuclear, Biological Chemical Reconnaissance System

The Fox vehicle is a six-wheeled, light armored vehicle designed primarily for reconnaissance of liquid chemical warfare agent hazards. On-board chemical warfare agent detection capabilities include the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer (primary detection device), the M43A1 chemical agent detector (an integral component of the M8 alarm system), and the M256A1 chemical agent detector kit. The Fox also has two radiation detectors. The Fox does not provide any biological warfare agent detection capability, but it does protect the crew from biological hazards, and it allows the crew to mark areas of potential hazard and safely take samples for laboratories to analyze for biological hazards.[176]

M256 Chemical Warfare Agent Detector Kit

In the field, the M256-series chemical warfare agent detector kit is referred to simply as the M256 kit. The portable, expendable M256 kit can detect and identify hazardous concentrations of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The M256 kit is used after a chemical warfare agent warning to test for and confirm the presence and type of chemical warfare agent, and to determine if it is safe to unmask. The M256A1 kit has replaced the M256 kit. The only difference between the two kits is that the M256A1 kit will detect lower levels of nerve agent. United States forces used both the M256 kit and the M256A1 kit during the Gulf War.

Some smokes, high temperatures, standard United States decontamination solution number two (DS2), and petroleum products may cause false readings. Sampling in smoke from burning debris may produce inaccurate results.[177]

M8A1 Chemical Alarm

The M8A1 is an automatic chemical agent detection and warning system designed to detect the presence of nerve agent vapors or inhalable aerosols. The M8A1 will automatically signal the presence of the nerve agent in the air with both an audible and visual warning. The United States military fielded the M8A1 to replace the wet chemical M8 detector'which eliminated the M229 refill kit, the logistic burden, and associated costs. The M8A1 operates in a fixed, portable, or vehicle mounted configuration.[178]

Mission Kill

Patriot intercepts that do not disable the ballistic missile warhead but nevertheless minimize damage on the ground. There were two types of mission kills. One involved low yield kills in which the Patriot damaged the ballistic missile warhead to the point that either it only burned at ground impact or it exploded with greatly reduced force. The other involved diversion in which a Patriot deflects the ballistic missile from its initial path and it impacted with no significant ground damage to personnel or major structures.[179]

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)

Mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system used to direct the wearing of chemical protective garments and mask'a system that balances mission requirements with the chemical warfare agent threat. Wearing chemical protective garments and mask provides individuals protection against most known chemical warfare agents, biological agents, and toxins. At MOPP Level 0 servicemembers carry their protective mask and keep their remaining MOPP gear readily available (e.g., within the work area, fighting position, living space, etc.) At MOPP Level 1, servicemembers wear their overgarment and carry the rest of their MOPP gear. At MOPP Level 2, servicemembers wear their overgarments and overboots while carrying the mask with hood and gloves. At MOPP Level 3, servicemembers wear their overgarment, overboots, and mask with hood, but not the gloves. At MOPP Level 4, servicemembers wear all their MOPP gear. Commanders can raise or lower the amount of protection through five levels of MOPP. In addition, commanders, under certain situations, can exercise a mask-only option.[180]

Patriot Surface-to- Air Missile System

The Patriot is a long-range, all-weather, high and low altitude system designed to defeat advanced aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. It can engage multiple, simultaneous targets. The Patriot Fire Unit consists of a radar, launchers, missiles, and battle management/command control and communications centers. The multifunction phased array radar provides surveillance, target detection and tracking, and missile guidance support. The trailer-mounted launcher holds four Patriot missiles in the configuration used most in Operation Desert Storm. The missile has a blast fragmentation warhead.[181] Each missile weighs 2,200 pounds and has a range of nearly 43 miles. When launched, the missile turns toward the target and enters the radar beam. A computer on the ground then directs the missile toward the target. In the terminal phase, the missile's internal radar receiver guides it to interception.[182]

VX

V-series nerve agent. Chemical Name: O-ethyl-S-(2-isopropylaminoethyl)methyl phosphonothiolate.[183]

Z time

Coordinated universal time (UTC), also called "zulu time," formally Greenwich Mean Time. The time in the time zone centered on the prime meridian and used by United States forces as a standard time in, for example, electronic messages because it puts global forces on the same clock.[184]

 

Breaking News:
April 17, 2006

Legal Marijuana Alternatives, Legal Highs, Herbal Ecstasy, from www.herbalsmokeshop.com

BACKSEAT BANGERS
There is nothing like the thrill of sex with a total stranger out on the public roadways!
MILF SEEKER
They aren't porn stars! 
No bullshit! It's reality! We find and fuck sexy mom's!.
BANG BOAT
We took this horny slut out for a 3 hour tour & fucked her on the bow and stern of our boat!
TEEN FOR CASH
How much dose it take to fuck a money starved teen slut? It only $80.00 & we can prove it!
HER FIRST BIG COCK
Watch as real girls I pick up off the street get a first taste of my ENORMOUS cock!
GANG BANG SQUAD
how much would it cost to get your average slut off the street to be gang banged by 4 dudes?
MY SEX TOUR
Join my buddy and I as we tour across the Europe in search of easily pressured girls! We find them and fuck!
PORN STUD SEARCH
Horny dumb bastards into thinking they could actually be the next Ron Jeremy!
HER FIRST LESBIAN SEX
100 % exclusive content of amateur girls having their first lesbian sex experience!


Patriotic American Visitors Since 9/11/01
This site was created on September 11, 2001 at 9:30 AM
Message Board Guest Book Live Chat Guest Map Mailing List Tell a Friend
Home ] Up ] Photos ] Videos ] News ] Have You Forgotten ] Collapse ] Rescue Dogs ] Facts ] Timeline ] Interactive ] Tenants ] Conspiracy ] Hoax ] New Design ] September 11 ] Ground Zero ] Questions ] Terrorists ] Terrorist Arrests ] Muslims ] Al-Farouq ] Memorial ] Victims ] Poems ] Tallest Towers ] Pentagon ] HomeLand ] South Korea ] Ready.gov ] Radiation Facts ] Biological Agents ] Chemical Agents ] Polls ] Search ] Archives ] Contents ] Link To US ] GOD ] Nick Berg ] Lynndie England ] Paul Johnson ]

World Trade Center Attack Memorial - September 11, 2001


Jumper
Photos

impact.jpg (20044 bytes)
Attack
Photos


Collapse
Photos


Rescue
Photos

WTC 1970
Construction
Photos


Light
Tribute


Before
Photos


 Rescue
Dogs


Video of 2nd plane hitting the WTC 
 

 
2nd Video of plane hitting the WTC


Video of 1st WTC collapse


 Video Overview
56k
| DSL | High

Breaking News From GOD: April 17, 2006 11:24 AM
Why Not Tell Your Best  Friend?

Please help out & link to us.
Tell a friend about this site.

Join our mailing list.

Google
Search WWW Search Twin-Towers.net

Send mail to Webmaster (at) Twin-Towers.net with questions or comments about this web site.
We have recently upgraded our hosting plan to accommodate your requests.
All WTC Photos, Memorials & Journals can now be posted to this site.
Please send your request to Webmaster (at) Twin-Towers.net
Last Updated: Monday, April 17, 2006 11:24 AM
Copyright © 2001 Twin-Towers.net
GOD BLESS AMERICA!

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, at 8:45am New York local time, One World Trade Center, the north tower, was hit by a hijacked 767 commercial jet airplane, loaded with fuel for a trans-continental flight. Two World Trade Center, the south tower, was hit by a similar hijacked jet 18 minutes later at 9:03am. (In separate but related attacks, the Pentagon building near Washington D.C. was hit by a hijacked 757 at 9:43am, and at 10:10am, a fourth hijacked jetliner crashed in Pennsylvania.)   The south tower, WTC 2, which had been hit second, was the first to suffer a complete structural collapse at 10:05am, 62 minutes after being hit itself, 80 minutes after the first impact. The north tower, WTC 1, then also collapsed at 10:29am, 104 minutes after being hit. WTC 7, a substantial 47 story office building in its own right, built in 1987, was damaged by the collapsing towers, caught fire, and later in the afternoon also totally collapsed.

The list of collapsed buildings (as confirmed by the New York Times through Saturday, 2001.0915) included all seven buildings of the World Trade center complex — including WTC 6, the U.S Customs House to the north; WTC 3, the 22 story Marriot World Trade Center hotel just west of Tower Two; and WTC 4 and 5, the Plaza Buildings to the east (although satellite images suggest much of WTC 5, the north Plaza Building, was still standing). Other nearby buildings were significantly damaged, including the St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church, and One Liberty Plaza, a 54 floor, 743' tall building across Church Street to the east.

About 2800 people died in the attack. The recovery and site clearing process officially concluded on May 30, 2002 with 1796 people still remain unrecovered. 1.8 million tons of debris was removed from the disaster site.

Yahoo! Buzz Index Overall Leaders 1. Jennifer Lopez 2. Britney Spears 3. Euro 2004 4. Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban 5. Usher 6. Paris Hilton 7. Detroit Pistons 8. Jessica Simpson 9. NBA 10. Linkin Park 11. Eminem 12. JoJo 13. Lindsay Lohan 14. Ryan Reynolds 15. Los Angeles Lakers Yahoo! Buzz Index Overall Movers 1. Matt Starr 2. Jeanie Buss 3. Marion Jones 4. Jennifer Lopez 5. Johnny Ramone 6. Bloomsday 7. Ulysses 8. Olympic Torch 9. Collateral 10. Nile River 11. Bill Davidson 12. Phil Jackson 13. Gone With the Wind 14. Iraq 15. Shelly Brown Yahoo! Buzz Index Television Leaders 1. Paris Hilton 2. Dragon Ball Z 3. Nicole Richie 4. Days of Our Lives 5. The Simpsons 6. Oprah Winfrey 7. American Idol 8. The Simple Life 2 9. Big Brother 10. Yu-Gi-Oh! 11. Entertainment Tonight 12. Sponge Bob Square Pants 13. Last Comic Standing 2 14. Friends 15. Sex and the City Yahoo! Buzz Index Music Leaders 1. Britney Spears 2. Usher 3. Jessica Simpson 4. Linkin Park 5. Eminem 6. JoJo 7. Beyonce Knowles 8. Slipknot 9. Christina Aguilera 10. D-12 11. Avril Lavigne 12. Tupac Shakur 13. Evanescence 14. Blink 182 15. 50 Cent Yahoo! Buzz Index Music Movers 1. Johnny Ramone 2. Ryan Cabrera 3. 98 Degrees 4. Alanis Morissette 5. Aretha Franklin 6. The Ramones 7. Justin Guarini 8. SWV 9. William Hung 10. Dave Navarro 11. Tim McGraw 12. Tragically Hip 13. Diana DeGarmo 14. Los Lobos 15. Lionel Richie Yahoo! Buzz Index Sports Leaders 1. Euro 2004 2. Detroit Pistons 3. NBA 4. Los Angeles Lakers 5. NASCAR 6. MLB 7. Kobe Bryant 8. NBA Finals 9. U.S. Open 10. David Beckham 11. Chicago Cubs 12. NFL 13. New York Yankees 14. Olympics 15. PGA Yahoo! Buzz Index Sports Movers 1. Jeanie Buss 2. Marion Jones 3. Olympic Torch 4. New York Marathon 5. Triple Crown 6. Chauncey Billups 7. Detroit Pistons 8. Larry Brown 9. Cristiano Ronaldo 10. Darko Milicic 11. Richard Hamilton 12. Jennie Finch 13. Tayshaun Prince 14. Karl Malone 15. Gary Payton Yahoo! Buzz Index Actors and Actresses Leaders 1. Jennifer Lopez 2. Lindsay Lohan 3. Ryan Reynolds 4. Ashlee Simpson 5. Hilary Duff 6. Pamela Anderson 7. Mary-Kate and Ashley Olsen 8. Carmen Electra 9. Orlando Bloom 10. Johnny Depp 11. Daniel Radcliffe 12. Courteney Cox 13. Angelina Jolie 14. Jennifer Aniston 15. Emma Watson Yahoo! Buzz Index Actors and Actresses Movers 1. Jennifer Lopez 2. Ryan Reynolds 3. Sylvester Stallone 4. Owen Wilson 5. Jay Mohr 6. Gael Garcia Bernal 7. Elle MacPherson 8. Linda Blair 9. Rachel Weisz 10. Fran Drescher 11. Samaire Armstrong 12. Jenna Elfman 13. Alexa Vega 14. Joaquin Phoenix 15. Kristanna Loken Yahoo! Buzz Index Movies Leaders 1. Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban 2. Shrek 2 3. Michael Moore 4. Spider-Man 5. Spider-Man 2 6. Lord of the Rings 7. Troy 8. Shrek 9. Fahrenheit 9-11 10. Star Wars 11. Batman Begins 12. The Day After Tomorrow 13. Stepford Wives 14. Alien vs. Predator 15. Chronicles of Riddick Yahoo! Buzz Index Video Games Leaders 1. Pokemon 2. Final Fantasy 3. GunBound 4. Sonic 5. Halo 2 6. EverQuest 7. Manhunt 8. The Sims 9. Resident Evil 10. Grand Theft Auto: Vice City 11. Star Wars Galaxies 12. Halo 13. Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas 14. Zelda 15. Mega Man Yahoo! Buzz Index Video Games Movers 1. NBA Live 2004 2. SOCOM 2 3. EverQuest 4. Pokemon Crater 5. Starcraft Cheats 6. Silent Hill 4 7. Battlefield 1942 8. Command and Conquer 9. Fire Emblem 10. Mortal Kombat 11. Final Fantasy X-2 12. Sonic 13. Counter-Strike Hacks 14. FFX 15. MVP Baseball 2004 Yahoo! Buzz Index Networks Leaders 1. ESPN 2. Cartoon Network 3. Nickelodeon 4. BBC 5. CNN 6. Disney Channel 7. MTV 8. Weather Channel 9. Food Network 10. CBS 11. QVC 12. Fox News 13. Univision 14. MSNBC 15. PBS Yahoo! Buzz Index Baseball Leaders 1. Chicago Cubs 2. New York Yankees 3. Houston Astros 4. Boston Red Sox 5. Los Angeles Dodgers 6. San Francisco Giants 7. Texas Rangers 8. San Diego Padres 9. St. Louis Cardinals 10. Cincinnati Reds 11. Philadelphia Phillies 12. Atlanta Braves 13. Chicago White Sox 14. Milwaukee Brewers 15. Anaheim Angels Yahoo! Buzz Index Basketball Leaders 1. Detroit Pistons 2. Los Angeles Lakers 3. Dallas Mavericks 4. Chicago Bulls 5. Indiana Pacers 6. Sacramento Kings 7. Minnesota Timberwolves 8. San Antonio Spurs 9. Boston Celtics 10. Houston Rockets 11. New Jersey Nets 12. Orlando Magic 13. Memphis Grizzlies 14. New York Knicks 15. Phoenix Suns Yahoo! Buzz Index Football Leaders 1. Dallas Cowboys 2. Oakland Raiders 3. Green Bay Packers 4. San Francisco 49ers 5. Chicago Bears 6. Washington Redskins 7. Pittsburgh Steelers 8. Philadelphia Eagles 9. Indianapolis Colts 10. Miami Dolphins 11. Cincinnati Bengals 12. Detroit Lions 13. Seattle Seahawks 14. Cleveland Browns 15. New York Giants Yahoo! Buzz Index Hockey Leaders 1. Tampa Bay Lightning 2. Detroit Red Wings 3. Calgary Flames 4. Philadelphia Flyers kate faber 

Paris Hilton Sex Video Tape

Evidence Cleaner Gold
Webmasters Click Here

WORLD TRADE CENTER TERRORIST ATTACK IN NEW YORK
World Trade Center in New York City: world trade center, terrorist attack, afghanistan, osama bin laden, bin laden, taliban, wtc, world trade center new york, new york world trade center, terrorism, world trade center bombing, terrorist, world trade center picture, world trade center photo, usama bin laden, afghanistan map, world trade center attack, wtc picture, world trade center new york city, wtc photo, map of afghanistan, world trade center ny, national tragedy, afghanistan news, world trade center video, world trade center disaster, world trade center pic, nostradamus world trade center, picture of the world trade center, picture of world trade center, wtc attack, who is osama bin laden, osama bin laden photo, the world trade center, bin laden joke, terrorist group, afghanistan taliban, afghanistan taliban, wtc new york, world trade center crash, world trade center victim, wtc video, world trade center plane crash, wtc pic, map afghanistan, osama bin laden picture, Donations For World Trade Center Victims Dot Com, world trade center survivor, world trade center tower, bin laden picture, afghanistan woman, where is afghanistan, afghanistan and the taliban, afghanistan newspaper, world trade center tragedy, wtc missing, world trade center direction, wtc bombing, world trade center missing, taliban woman, wtc victim, world and trade and center, osma bin laden, world trade center in new york, world trade center map, who is bin laden, picture world trade center, afghanistan history, world trade center history, photo world trade center, osama bin laden joke, world trade center devil, afghanistan war, wtc survivor, world trade center attack photo, wtc disaster, world trade center building, world trade center news, world trade center nyc, world trade center tenant, terrorist attack picture, new york tragedy, tragedy, photo of world trade center, ny world trade center, osama bin laden biography, world trade center collapse, world trade center image, picture of afghanistan, world trade center bombing picture, ossama bin laden, world trade center web cam, terrorist handbook, world trade center wallpaper, world trade center attack picture, picture of osama bin laden, afghanistan online, terrorist attack photo, nostradamus wtc, world trade center terrorist attack, afghanistan flag, bin laden photo, bin laden humor, world trade center address, terrorist attack video, world trade center missing person, world trade center twin tower, attack on world trade center, international terrorism, asama bin laden, bin laden cartoon, picture of wtc, kill bin laden, new york terrorist attack, world trade center directory, wtc missing person, history of afghanistan, osam bin laden, the taliban, world trade center business, wtc missing list, terrorist picture, wtc attack photo, picture of bin laden, afghanistan military, bin laden pic, world trade center survivor list, world trade center disaster picture, wtc victim list, kabul afghanistan, terrorist attack on america, wtc crash, afghanistan picture, world trade center photograph, library afghanistan, world trade center disaster photo, population of afghanistan, terrorist organization, world trade center construction, web cam world trade center, wtc devil, osama and bin and laden, world trade center memorial, world trade center victim list, bin and laden, bin laden wanted poster, world trade center cam, nostradamus and world trade center, afghanistan government, woman in afghanistan, new world trade center, video world trade center, world trade center missing list, world trade center satan, world trade center fact, climbing world trade center new york city, bin laden game, osama bin laden pic, terrorist photo, terrorist attack usa, wtc image, taliban government, osama bin laden, new york wtc, counter terrorism, picture wtc, photo wtc, wtc survivor list, world trade center plane, world trade center joke, osoma bin laden, world trade center terrorist, afghani taliban council of europe sep us, osana bin laden, wtc tragedy, wtc tragedy, devil world trade center, world trade center attack video, wtc ny, wtc attack picture, nyc world trade center, satan world trade center, world trade center nostradamus, missing world trade center, new york terrorist, world trade center explosion, afghanistan population, terrorism in america, terrorist attack new york, american tragedy, history of the world trade center, history of world trade center, terrorist bombing, world trade center list, when was the world trade center built, taliban militia, world trade center terrorism, world trade center terrorism, taliban group, plane crash world trade center, world trade center devil picture, photo of the world trade center, wtc missing person list, world trade center missing person list, world trade center smoke, terrorist attack world trade center, world trade center bombing photo, picture of terrorist attack, world trade center and new york, a map of afghanistan, pic of world trade center, center trade world, world trade center tribute, photo of wtc, missing wtc, anti terrorism, usama bin laden home page, bin laden biography, terrorist attack on world trade center, wtc disaster photo, news world trade center, world trade center manhattan, world trade center missing people, world trade center bombing killed injured, workd trade center face, who are the taliban, new york terrorism, wtc plane crash, history of terrorism,  taliban history, wtc list, osami bin laden, osama bin laden cartoon, wtc attack video, wtc terrorist attack, wtc joke, taliban in afghanistan, taliban in afghanistan, bin laden poster, terrorist attack u.s, afghanistan geography, wtc tribute, september tragedy, bin laden target, wtc defender, kill osama bin laden, us terrorist attack, wtc missing people, bin laden group, osama bin laden humor, taliban afghanistan, taliban afghanistan, wtc wallpaper, afghanistan joke, afghanistan chat, terrorist cell, terrorist attack in new york, osman bin laden, wtc memorial, terrorist attack on new york, osama bin laden wanted poster, bin laden t shirt, wtc tower, wtc collapse, joke bin laden, where is osama bin laden, afghanistan culture, ussamah bin laden, islamic terrorist, afghanistan web site, usamah bin laden, wtc face, wtc satan, attack on wtc, picture of wtc attack, wtc news, war on terrorism, wtc devil picture, terrorist attack on us, wtc smoke, missing person wtc, wtc virus, wtc disaster picture, afghanistan weather, terrorist attack pic, nuke bin laden, osaman bin laden, terrorist act, wtc web cam, terrorism in new york, wtc bombing picture, terrorist video, art bell terrorist attack, afghanistan photo, radio afghanistan, nostradamus terrorist, biological terrorism, terrorism attack, soviet invasion of afghanistan, information on afghanistan, anti bin laden, picture of the wtc, taliban home page, bin laden interview, usame bin laden, video wtc, twin tower tragedy, terrorist new york, where is bin laden, wtc crash video, victim of wtc, terrorist joke, laden bin osama, bin laden family, afghanistan taleban, wtc jumpers, taliban news, domestic terrorism, taliban web site, fuck bin laden, afghanistan and map, humor bin laden, information on osama bin laden, terrorist news, laden bin, wtc terrorist, wtc terrorist, bomb bin laden, northern alliance afghanistan, afghanistan terrorist, afghanistan terrorist, america tragedy, wtc devil face, terrorist attack image, nostradamus bin laden, devil wtc, osama bin laden game, bin laden wanted dead or alive, islamic terrorism, muslim terrorist, afghanistan embassy, afghanistan northern alliance, anti terrorist, afghanistan army, photo of bin laden, bin laden liquor, pic of wtc,  bin laden construction, terrorist attack america, the latest news on the national tragedy, biography of osama bin laden, photo of wtc attack, philippine terrorism, terrorism picture, satan wtc, photo of terrorist attack, arab terrorist, picture of terrorist, terrorist target, bin laden video, victim wtc, ussama bin laden, usama bin laden picture, afghanistan religion, terrorist victim, photo of osama bin laden, war in afghanistan, ny wtc, bin laden song, who is the taliban, osama bin laden interview, terrorist threat, wtc building, american terrorist, colorado hijacking bin laden, wtc map, terrorist atack, taliban womens right, wtc conspiracy, afghanistan taliban history, terrorist web site, afghanistan taliban history, quien es osama bin laden, terrorist world trade center, afghanistan bombing, osama bin laden home page, new york wtc attack, picture of the terrorist attack, wtc nyc, joke about bin laden, taliban law, wtc devil photo, wtc tenant, bio terrorism, nostradamus terrorist attack, russia afghanistan, taliban regime, tragedy in new york, omar bin laden, wtc nostradamus, terrorist attack to aircraft, wtc plane, american terrorist attack, wtc flag, wtc hoax, world trade center tragedy picture, wtc face in smoke, usa terrorist attack, wtc eagle, woman of afghanistan, catholic church terrorism, afghanistan online chat room, terrorist cook book, nyc wtc, wtc flight numbers, osama bin laden target, kipling afghanistan, picture bin laden, devil face wtc, terrorist pic, capital of afghanistan, nostradamus and wtc, wtc donations, wtc bombing photo, russia afghanistan war, funny picture of bin laden, missing in wtc, terrorist list, oussama bin laden, wtc photograph, afghanistan russia map, web cam wtc, osama bin laden video, osuma bin laden, terrorist manual, osamma bin laden, funny picture of osama bin laden, world map afghanistan, attack wtc, china taliban, russian afghanistan war, afghanistan web cam, letter to terrorist, who is/are the osama bin laden, osama bin laden t shirt, terrorist attack on usa, soviet invasion plan map on afghanistan, wtc death, terrorist attack on wtc, terrorist attack on wtc, wtc screensaver, funny bin laden picture, wtc movie, terrorism hit america, cyber terrorism, osama bin laden poster, bin laden dead or alive, mapa de afghanistan, joke about osama bin laden, history of the taliban, world trade center tragedy photo, terrorist attack wtc, american terrorism, terrorist attack wtc, known terrorist, bin laden home page, anarchist cook book terrorist handbook, terrorist activity, terrorist attack nostradamus, osama bin laden egypt, wtc attack pic, terrorist cartoon, bin laden wanted, open letter to a terrorist, funny bin laden, picture osama bin laden, afghanistan geographic map, nuclear terrorism, pic of bin laden, osama bin laden bio, terrorism history, bin laden suck, wtc terrorism, taliban belief, terrorist task force, an american tragedy, afghanistan air force, video of terrorist attack, womens right in afghanistan, attack terrorist, terrorist attack on the world trade center, terrorism statistics, terrorist country, flag of afghanistan, definition of terrorism, nostradamus terrorism, terrorism in the united state, revolutionary association of the woman of afghanistan, attack from terrorist, terrorism photo, open letter to terrorist, islam terrorism, ny tragedy, afghanistan terrain, america terrorist attack, terrorism in usa, news afghanistan, history of taliban, taliban rule, international terrorist, afghanistan on line, how big is afghanistan, terrorism new york, mapa afghanistan, most wanted terrorist, afghanistan topography, the taliban news, us terrorism, bomb afghanistan, photo terrorist attack, terrorist letter, what time is it in afghanistan, afghanistan home page, afghanistan music, terrorist attack in america, afghanistan mountain, geography of afghanistan, taliban joke, middle east afghanistan, middle east terrorist, bin ladin terrorist, trade center tragedy, new york city tragedy, afghanistan terrorism, afghanistan terrorism, taliban religion, afghanistan attack, terrorism counter terrorism, history afghanistan, afghanistan bin laden, afghanistan food, picture terrorist attack, foreign terrorist group, terrorist in new york, taliban execution, islamic terrorist group, afghanistan chat room, information about afghanistan, afghanistan people, us tragedy, terrorist bin laden, population afghanistan, a map of the country afghanistan, bin laden terrorist, map pakistan afghanistan, soviet afghanistan war, what doe taliban mean, tragedy picture, terrorism world trade center, video terrorist attack, victim of terrorist attack, world trade center terrorist attack picture, afghanistan refugee, terrorist attach, taliban song, afghanistan chat rooms, world terrorism, picture of terrorism, sharia taliban bush, afghanistan fact, government of afghanistan, picture of world trade center tragedy, middle east terrorism, terrorism research center, t taliban giving, fatwa terrorism, palestinian terrorism, death terrorism, taliban and afghanistan, picture of the tragedy, taliban humor, world trade terrorism, afghanistan and taliban, terrorism wtc, bin laden terrorism, terrorism in ny, taliban osama bin laden, terrorism afghanistan, afghanistans taliban, taliban chat, woman taliban, information about the taliban, tragedy world trade center, taliban cia, jesse jackson taliban, tragedy quote, taliban islam, terrorist tragedy, taliban official, prayer for tragedy, pakistan taliban, taliban information, tragedy pic,  united state tragedy, photo of new york tragedy, world trade center tragedy video, wtc tragedy pic, tragedy in new york city, photo of the world trade center tragedy, the tragedy, tragedy wtc, world trade tower tragedy, tragedy prayer, picture of the national tragedy, the new york tragedy, tragedy in usa. twin towers photo, world trade center, lower manhattan, wtc video, nyc, wtc, world trade centre, world, trade, center, wtc video, wtc attack, picture of wtc, wtc victims, wtc jumper, jumper card, jumper cards, wtc devil, wtm memorial, terrorist, terrorists, osama bin Laden, usama,laden, nyc, twin, towers, news, current news, recent news, breaking news, war, usa, infinite justice, recovery, rebuild, remember, renew, development, housing, financial assistance, victim assistance, memorial, pentagon, air tragedy, air crash, united states, america, Pennsylvania, terrorism, twin towers, christian, music, song for america, american airlines, united airlines, september 11, 911, terrorism, terrorist, hijack, tragedy, crash, attack, war, relief, claim, help, info, information, New York, Washington DC, airline, security, airport, highjack, a picture of the twin tower, wtc  photo, wtc jumpers, new york twin tower, wallpaper, history tower twin, center tower trade twin world, twin tower collapse, tower twin video, light tower twin, 11 september tower twin, twin tower memorial, petronas twin tower, twin tower 911, picture september11 tower twin, 9 11 twin tower, new york city twin tower, wtc twin tower, nyc twin tower,  9/11 picture tower twin, poem tower twin, burning tower twin, 11 picture september tower twin, new york twin tower picture, 20 bill dollar tower twin, bill dollar tower twenty twin, art clip tower twin, construction tower twin, jumpers tower twin, twin tower building, 11 2001 september tower twin, attack terrorist tower twin, from jumping people tower twin, eagle tower twin, devil face tower twin, fire picture tower twin, drawing tower twin,  collapsing picture tower twin, fact tower twin, attack photo tower twin, background tower twin, inside tower twin, movie tower twin, 11th september tower twin, devil tower twin, info tower twin, 9/11 photo  sept 11 twin tower, height tower twin, light memorial tower twin,  01 11 9 tower twin, jumping people tower twin,  in new picture tower twin york, clipart tower twin, story tower twin, crash plane tower twin, twin tower pin, the twin tower, 20 bill tower twin, attack before picture tower twin, 11 9 picture tower twin, nyc picture tower twin, face in smoke tower twin, death tower twin, art tower twin, twin tower in new york city,

www.William-Hung.org
www.Julius-Erving.com
French Military Victories
French Military Victories
www.AndreaMackris.com
Jedi Master.net
e-olympic.com
earchive.net
enude.org