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Scud Missle Photos & News Bernard
Rostker Many veterans of the Gulf War have expressed concern that their unexplained illnesses may result from their experiences in that war. In response to veterans' concerns, the Department of Defense established a task force in June 1995 to investigate incidents and circumstances relating to possible causes. The Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses assumed responsibility for these investigations on November 12, 1996, and has continued to investigate topics related to reports of chemical warfare agent incidents. To inform the public about the progress of these efforts, the Department of Defense is publishing on the Internet and elsewhere accounts that may contribute to the discussion of possible causes of illnesses of Gulf War veterans, along with documentary evidence or personal testimony used in compiling the accounts. This information paper will aid in understanding incidents involving Iraq's use of Scud missiles.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
END NOTES
I. SUMMARY Iraq began launching short-range ballistic missiles (known as Scuds) at Israel and Coalition forces soon after the Coalition's Gulf War air campaign began on January 17, 1991. Many Gulf War veterans observed or became aware of incoming or overflying Scud missiles, Patriot missiles fired in defense, and Scud missile or debris impacts. American and other Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations knew that Iraq had the capability to use chemical and biological weapons, and Scud missile attacks represented a significant cause for concern for anyone within their range. This Information Paper offers a primer on Scud missiles and describes Iraq's use of Scuds during the Gulf War. The paper also briefly reviews topics related to counter-Scud operations, including Patriot missile defenses. Iraq filled both chemical and biological warheads for their Scud missiles before the Gulf War. However, Iraq probably feared retaliation if they used them. In-depth research for this paper uncovered no hard evidence that Iraq fired Scuds with chemical or biological warheads during the Gulf War. All Scud debris analyzed indicated use of conventional warheads. Iraq's Scud attacks involved 88 missiles, of which 46 reached Coalition countries in the Kuwait theater of operations and 42 reached or closely approached Israel. A few more probably failed early in flight and struck within Iraq's borders. Iraq told United Nations inspectors after the war that they launched 93 ballistic missiles, 50 against the Coalition in the Kuwait theater of operations and 43 against Israel. Scuds, while inaccurate, nonetheless damaged area targets and caused 28 of the 148 United States battle deaths during the Gulf War. Scuds often broke up on reentry, dispersing propellant that sometimes caused burning sensations of the skin and throat, nausea, headaches, breathing difficulties and other symptoms in some United States servicemembers. Also, Scud attacks and precautionary alerts disrupted lives and operations by forcing passive defense measures and generating stress.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND[1] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) used the nickname "Scud B" when referring to the Soviet-made, mobile, single-stage, single-warhead, liquid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile (originally designated by the Soviets as the R-17). Within the intelligence community, it also carried the designation SS-1c (SS for surface-to-surface). The Soviets developed this missile from an earlier version (Scud A) fielded in the 1950s, which they based in turn on the infamous German V-2 of World War II. The Scud B model first appeared with Soviet operational forces in 1962.[2] The Soviet Union provided Iraq with Scuds mounted with conventional warheads during the 1970s and 1980s.[3] During its war with Iran, Iraq first developed modified or "stretched" Scuds, resulting in the Al Hussein model, with enough propellant and range to reach Iran's capital of Tehran. Because Baghdad is closer to the Iran-Iraq border than Tehran, Iran was able to reach Baghdad from much closer range with their own Scuds and did not need longer-range missiles. The Al Hussein closed the "missile gap." During the seven-week "war of the cities" in early 1988, Iraq's Scuds rained terror on Tehran and other Iranian cities while Iran used unmodified Scud Bs against Baghdad and other targets in Iraq. Iraq's missiles with high explosive warheads killed about 2,000 Iranians and injured 6,000. Over a quarter of the population of ten million fled Tehran. In April of 1988, Iran ended its Scud attacks on Iraq and subsequently negotiated for peace.[4] In the wake of his success with the modified Scud, Saddam Hussein sought further improvements with the Al Abbas and the Al Hijarah models.
III. IRAQ'S SCUD CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES Coalition forces knew the ballistic missiles that Iraq developed from Soviet Scud Bs as "Scuds," regardless of Iraq's Arabic names for their longer-range variants. For this reason, we have used the same shorthand in this paper. Iraq fired mainly the Al Hussein model at the Kuwait theater of operations and Israel.
Figure 1. Scud missile components[5] Figure 1[5] diagrams the basic components of Iraq's Scuds. Regardless of the variants, original Scud B, Al Hussein, Al Abbas, or Al Hijarah, all of Iraq's Scuds were liquid fueled, short-range ballistic missiles with a crude guidance system. Unsophisticated gyroscopes guided the missile only during powered flight, which lasted about 80 seconds for the Al Hussein variant.[6] Once the rocket motor shut down, the entire missile with the warhead attached coasted unguided to the target area.[7] Consequently, Scuds had notoriously poor accuracy, and the farther they flew, the more inaccurate they became.[8] Table 1 reflects key data on Iraq's ballistic missiles including the Scud B acquired from the USSR and the three variants produced by Iraq by modifying the original Scud configuration.
Table 1. Characteristics of Iraq's selected missiles [9]
All of Iraq's Scuds used kerosene as the fuel and some form of red fuming nitric acid, probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)[11] as the oxidizer. Iraq told the United Nations Special Commission inspectors after the war that they had not experimented with unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), a more powerful (and toxic) fuel than kerosene, for their Scuds, which would require engine redesign. However, inspectors subsequently uncovered evidence that Iraq did experiment with UDMH,[12] but this investigation found no evidence that Iraq switched to UDMH during the Gulf War. To extend the Scud's range, Iraq cut Scud Bs apart and inserted airframe sections from these missiles into other Scud Bs to increase the capacities of the fuel and oxidizer tanks from about 8,700 pounds to about 11,000 pounds.[13] Iraq also reduced warhead weight from 2,200 pounds to less than 1,100 pounds. (See Table 1 above.) In 1991, Iraq had three kinds of mobile Scud launchers for its operational Scud models.[14] Other support vehicles included cranes, separate tanker trucks for fuel and oxidizer, command and control vans, and missile resupply vehicles.[15] Iraq's modifications to the Scud Bs created flight stability problems. Unlike more modern ballistic missile designs, the Scud's warhead does not detach from the rest of the missile after the boost phase (the period when the rocket motor fires and accelerates the missile). The missile body reenters the atmosphere still attached to the warhead. The changes in the center of gravity and weight distribution between the modified warhead and missile body, plus the added speed and subsequent increase in atmospheric heating during reentry, made the missiles unstable and often caused them to disintegrate before impact. Such break-ups degraded accuracy by changing missile trajectory. Iranian reports about Al Hussein attacks during the Iran-Iraq war noted that the missiles frequently broke into pieces. Coalition and Israeli reports about Gulf War Scud attacks contained similar observations (see Section V below).
IV. SCUDS AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS The evidence clearly shows that Saddam Hussein eventually intended to field operational Scuds armed with chemical and biological warheads, and he committed substantial resources to that end.[16] However, did Iraq successfully achieve that goal by the time of Operation Desert Storm? A. Threat Estimates Before Operation Desert Storm Information from before the Gulf War generated serious concern among Coalition forces about Iraq's possible use of Scuds armed with chemical or biological warheads. Pre-war intelligence judged that Iraq might have chemical warheads for Scuds.[17] One source said that despite very unstable flight characteristics, Iraq successfully completed development of a Scud with a chemical warhead in 1990, and that Iraq had stockpiled 150 Scuds with chemical warheads.[18] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) judged that these warheads would most likely contain persistent chemical warfare agents such as VX (nerve agent) or mustard (blister agent).[19] However, another report quotes an Iraqi engineer who claimed to have worked on the Al Hussein and Al Abbas missile programs. This engineer stated that Iraq still had not succeeded in manufacturing chemical warheads for its ballistic missiles and that Saddam Hussein's threat to launch Scuds with chemical warheads at Israel was "a mere poker game."[20] According to an intelligence source, the Al Hussein missile could carry either chemical warfare (CW) or biological warfare (BW) warheads. Iraq could mount a biological agent warhead on the Al Abbas version of the Scud. This source reported Iraq planned to use cholera for biological warfare against targets in the Gulf region (but weaponization of cholera could not be verified later).[21] Intelligence agencies may have put less emphasis on Scuds as a biological threat, but they considered that threat real. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed:
Another CIA document stated:
B. Information During the War After Iraq began its Scud attacks, Coalition forces saw reports suggesting the possibility of imminent attacks by Iraq with chemically or biologically armed Scuds. The first Scud attack on Israel occurred on January 18, 1991, the day after the Coalition began offensive air operations. An 82nd Airborne Division log sheet noted at 5:32 AM on January 18th that "Israelis have informed the United States that at least some of the missiles that impacted were chemical rds [rounds]."[24] We could not determine who initiated this report, and shortly after 6:00 AM a retraction was transmitted.[25] Israeli officials confirmed to the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses that none of the Scuds that attacked Israel carried chemical or biological agent warheads.[26] As the Coalition air campaign proceeded, a VII Corps log included an entry at 8:00 PM on January 20th noting that "a source of unknown reliability" stated that Saddam had ordered a chemical/biological attack for the following day.[27] The XVIII Airborne Corps advised the 82nd Airborne Division intelligence staff several hours later that a chemical (or biological) attack would most likely come by surface-to-surface missiles and estimated the likelihood of such an attack at 50 percent.[28] On January 27, 1991, another report stated that Saddam Hussein had ordered the beginning of chemical attacks.[29] The CIA noted that Iraq's forces "would be 'virtually certain' to use chemical weapons if they were pushed back by an Allied offensive."[30] As the Coalition ground campaign began, the DIA assessed that "Baghdad may be tempted to launch non-conventional [i.e., chemical or biological warfare agent] attacks with whatever warheads are available."[31] However, the expected chemical or biological attacks did not materialize. Even before the Gulf War ended, media reporting indicated Iraq had used no such weapons aboard Scuds. As one newspaper article noted, "Speculation that Iraq also would fit chemical warheads atop longer-range Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas missiles have [sic] not been borne out by the 67 firings so far of these missiles on civilian and military targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. This fact has caused some officials to conclude that Iraq still lacks the capability of placing chemical warheads on the longer-range Scuds."[32] Intelligence suggested one possible reason no chemical or biological warfare attacks had occurred. The CIA reported in January 1991 that, while Iraq had chemical warheads for Scud missiles, it had not yet mastered the fuse technology and trigger mechanism to detonate the warhead. The same report stated that Iraq's missile officials were considering having Scud missiles deliver chemical or biological weapons, counting on Patriot missiles to intercept the Scuds, thus dispersing the agent and contaminating an estimated 60 square kilometers (23 square miles).[33] Such a concept suggested that Iraq knew that their own Scud contact fusing could not do a good job, although an area would still be contaminated. As a United States government assessment indicated at the time, analysts did not expect a Patriot intercept to increase dissemination of agent, and it might greatly reduce such dissemination.[34] The Armed Forces Journal International magazine also reflected upon the technical challenges involved in arming Scuds with chemical warfare payloads:
The United States Air Force's Tactical Air Command speculated in early March 1991 that
C. Post-War Findings A declassified DIA document reported that a thorough analysis of each Scud impact point in at least the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) area uncovered no evidence of chemical warfare agents or their decomposition products.[37] We did not find any indication of verified detection of chemical warfare agents in any other Scud impact areas, including Israel where officials confirmed all Scud warheads recovered were conventional.[38] In accepting United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, Iraq agreed to a cease-fire, intrusive inspections, and elimination of their weapons of mass destruction and related materiel including Scuds. To perform the inspections and monitor Iraq's compliance with the agreement, the United Nations created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).[39] After the Gulf War, publicly-released UNSCOM information, as well as the United States intelligence community's independent information collection and analysis, provided insight regarding Iraq's ability to field Scuds fitted with chemical and biological warfare agent warheads. From such sources, we gained perspective on what the Coalition might have faced had Iraq possessed and used workable Scuds with such warheads. UNSCOM verified that Iraq produced 50 chemical and 25 biological Scud warheads that could have been filled for field-operations. Iraq also produced five warheads specifically designed for trials of chemical warfare agents. Of the 50 chemical warfare agent warheads, 16 were filled with the nerve agent sarin and 34 were filled with binary components (chemicals that mix and produce sarin nerve agent) or the persistent nerve agent VX. UNSCOM did not identify the biological agents.[40] In 1995, Iraq admitted to UNSCOM inspectors that it had produced the biological warfare agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.[41] Inspectors found that Iraq had launched a crash program in December 1990 to field weapons with BW agents to include artillery shells and some Al Hussein Scuds. Iraq claimed they never used such weapons because the United States sent them a message implying that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, the United States would counterattack with nuclear weapons. According to Iraq, Israeli officials sent a similar message.[42] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons against Coalition forces in the Gulf War.[43] For example, Near East South Asia (NESA), a CIA office focused on the Middle East and other areas, thoroughly searched their files regarding potential use of chemical warfare (CW) of biological warfare (BW) agents by Iraq during the Gulf War. They summarized the results as follows: 1) They found no evidence that Iraq's leaders ordered chemical or biological warfare agent use during the Gulf War and no conclusive evidence that Iraq's forces employed those weapons; 2) Iraq had some Scud missile warheads loaded with CW and BW agents, and that Iraq planned to retaliate with CW and BW weapons for a nuclear attack on Baghdad; and 3) Husayn Kamil (Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law and former chief of Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical weapons development who defected to the west) stated in August 1995 that Iraq's officials believed that the United States would respond with tactical nuclear weapons if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the Coalition.[44] This summary suggests that Iraq did not employ CW or BW weapons against Coalition forces. We have assembled in Tab C excerpts from operational reports regarding chemical agent testing and any symptoms (or lack thereof) for the Scud incidents in the Kuwait theater of operations discussed in Section V below. Reporting on this issue demonstrates that Iraq did not arm Scuds launched against Coalition forces with chemical warheads.
V. IRAQ'S USE OF SCUDS DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM A. Introduction Support for this Information Paper came from hundreds of pages of operational and open source evidence, allowing investigators to piece together lists of Iraq's Scud firings (presented below by general target area). Source documents sometimes contained inconsistent information. Even official logs and chronologies frequently recorded disparate detail and third-hand accounts. While a large volume of contemporary 1991 operational reporting has been declassified or released, some of the most reliable sources of information on Scud firings contain sensitive details and remain classified. Investigators considered all available information in constructing summaries for each attack. For completeness, however, our summaries below cite reports with alternative information on numbers of Scuds in an attack, Patriot defensive reactions, ground damage, and other details. For some operational logs and chronologies we uncovered only individual pages detached at some point and set aside because they touched on Scuds. In some cases, we could not identify the originating military organization, but all such evidence came from archives of official documents that the services reviewed for use in this paper. The brief summaries that follow integrate what we know regarding Scuds fired at targets in the KTO and against Israel. The map in Figure 2 plots generalized launch locations in Iraq, impact areas in the KTO and Israel, and approximate maximum range of Scuds from the launch areas.[45]
Figure 2. Scud launch areas, target regions, and Al Hussein range We have converted all times to local date and time in the KTO.[46] In the rest of this section we first discuss the total number of Scud missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel during the Gulf War. Available counts vary. We follow this with separate coverage of the Scud attacks in four geographic regions: the eastern KTO, the Riyadh area, the region of KKMC and Hafir Al Batin, and finally Israel. We summarize in tables the Scud strikes against each KTO region and follow the tables with a few more detailed accounts of the most significant incidents. B. Total Scud Firing Incidents At one of our veterans' outreach programs in 1998, a veteran questioned the number of Scud missiles fired against Coalition forces during the Gulf War. He based his opinions on an internal working document produced by the Armed Forces Center for Unit Records Research (CURR) and provided by that Department of Defense organization to some veterans. The listing had 179 incident entries totaling 344 missiles. A junior officer of the Center had compiled a list of Scud launch information from hundreds of operational reports, many with inconsistent data. Not knowing which accounts were correct, this officer included all versions of what happened. CURR designed the list to serve as a reference for responding to veterans' communications regarding Scud incidents at particular times. Our research and analysis confirmed that Iraq fired 46 Scuds into the KTO. The rest of the entries in the CURR list involve duplicate reporting or other incorrect information. We have included the CURR compilation and our analysis of it in Tab D. The operational documents that CURR used as sources for their summary we used in preparing this information paper. Many of these documents were not previously available. After the Gulf War, various authors and government agencies published assessments of Iraq's Scud attacks including the numbers of missiles fired at Coalition forces and Israel. Pieced together from differing data sets, the totals varied generally within a narrow range. Table 2 summarizes the data from selected authors and organizations. The United States Space Command's count of 97 launches includes nine more than the 88 missiles our investigation determined struck Coalition countries and in or near Israel. Some of the sources cited in Table 2 noted several early in-flight failures that could explain this difference. In reassessing unclassified or declassified material on individual attacks, we can now account for the 46 Scuds that attacked the KTO but only 41 of the 42 Scuds that struck in or near Israel (for a total of 87). However, based on all available information, including classified documents, we are confident that a total of 88 missiles struck in or near the KTO and Israel. In the summaries that follow we break out the 87 firing incidents covered in unclassified or declassified documents by general area attacked (the eastern KTO, Riyadh, KKMC/Hafir Al Batin, and Israel). These incidents are summarized in Figure 3.[47] After an initial period of intense daily attacks, the number of missiles launched against the Coalition and Israel per day fell off substantially. Table 2. Number of missiles fired by source
Figure 3. Scud attacks by target area During the war, some intelligence estimates concluded that Iraq fired Al Abbas missiles with an even greater estimated range than the Al Hussein. Authorities later determined that Iraq fired only the Al Hussein extended range missile except for five attacks with the Al Hijarah variant.[56] The KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area did not get targeted until the later stages of the Scud attacks. At the end of the war, Iraq fired several Scuds toward Bahrain and Qatar in the eastern KTO (See the regional summaries in Sections C and E below.) Because many Scuds broke up as they reentered the denser atmosphere, and Patriots intercepted others, some observers might believe a single missile attack included more missiles than was the case. Also, the kinetic energy of heavy debris striking the ground at about 3,600 miles per hour (one mile per second) could cause a significant crater.[57] Both the heavy warhead and engine sections sometimes separated from either end of the missile body on reentry. In these instances, the large but now significantly lighter missile body could decelerate enough from air resistance to survive impact almost intact, as several did.[58] C. Scud Incidents in the Eastern KTO Below we address Scud attacks in the Eastern KTO. In this section and those that follow, we summarize the nature of attacks in table entries, including the best available information on the number of attacking missiles. We also note alternative missile numbers we determined were inaccurate but that appeared somewhere in operational reporting (alternative reporting or "alt rpts" numbers in the fourth column). We follow the tables with more detailed accounts of a few incidents chosen because of potential veteran interest or operational significance. Often, many unit logs, chronologies, and summaries recorded the same Scud attack. In such cases we cite only representative and substantive samples for practical reasons. However, we reviewed all cited references as different documents often contained additional data that could provide a more complete picture of the incidents. 1. Summary Evidence indicates that Iraq fired 19 Scuds against the areas of Dhahran, Al Jubayl, Bahrain, and Qatar. Table 3 summarizes the details and describes each event.
2. Details on Selected Incidents a. January 20th Attack on Dhahran (Event 1 in Table 3) Shortly before 10 PM on January 20th, Iraq fired the first two Scuds at the Dhahran area.[66] One report noted that Patriot units fired five missiles at three (rather than the actual two) Scuds and that M8 chemical agent alarms went off, but subsequent tests proved negative.[67] A separate United States Air Force unit at Dhahran logged an entry at 9:50 PM noting multiple explosions. Checks revealed that none of that unit's chemical agent detectors had alarmed. A later entry reported a possible impact near a barracks and the United States Army Component United States Central Command headquarters as well as near a Saudi police camp and the port area. Subsequent investigation turned up no building damage, casualties, or unexploded ordnance.[68] A witness to the January 20th attack remembered that a Patriot battery took out the Scuds near a pier in Dhahran and that everybody went to MOPP Level 4 (full chemical protection ' see glossary at Tab A) for about six or seven hours while tests and assessments were made. He did not know the test results, but an "all clear" was sounded permitting a termination of the chemical alert.[69] A chemical company soldier remembered witnessing repeated M8A1 chemical agent alarms and positive M256 chemical detection kit tests the first night of Scud attacks in the Dhahran area and recalls remaining in MOPP Level 4 for seven hours. He believed no one had chemical agent symptoms.[70] b. January 22nd Attack on Dhahran (Event 4 in Table 3) Shortly after 7:00 AM on January 22nd, Iraq fired three Scuds toward Dhahran. The first two flew outside of the Patriots' defended area with at least one landing in the desert about 50 miles west of town. The other reportedly went down in Gulf waters north of Qatar. Most unclassified sources credit Patriots with intercepting the third Scud.[71] Debris reportedly struck on a Dhahran Air Base runway just as an aircraft took off to the south, but the aircraft apparently escaped damage.[72] Most pieces of debris were described as small (less than 3 inches), but something falling out of the sky caused a crater 23 feet in diameter and 4 feet deep on the air base. All but one field test indicated no presence of chemical warfare agent. In that one positive chemical warfare agent test, a chemical agent monitor registered a very low concentration on the nerve agent scale. Subsequent testing at that location proved negative.[73] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle (see glossary at Tab A) took samples from the crater area for additional testing, but we found no specific results of any Fox tests. Alternative reporting included a fourth Scud that appeared in some chronologies at this time as a target for two Patriot launches. However, this track represented a false target (radar interference ' see Section VI.B). One summary suggested that Patriot units fired two missiles at each of three Scuds.[74] c. February 16th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3) Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16th.[75] The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud.[76] The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile's impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier.[77] Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.
Figure 4. Map of Jubayl harbor Scud impact One witness recalls hearing a loud explosion and seeing white-hot objects falling.[78] The Scud caused no casualties or damage, but it exuded a blue, green, and yellow substance and bubbled a strong-smelling gas for some time (probably inhibited red fuming nitric acid ' see Section VII). United States Navy explosive ordnance disposal specialists eventually recovered the missile in parts using divers, flotation bags, and a crane. Test results performed on this Scud determined that it did not have a chemical or biological warhead.[79] Figure 5 shows the recovered high explosive warhead.[80]
Figure 5. Recovered Scud warhead d. February 25th Attack on Dhahran (Event 10 in Table 3) Iraq launched one Scud toward Dhahran early in the evening of February 25th. One Patriot battery on Dhahran airfield was not operational and another nearby did not track the Scud, apparently because of a software problem.[81] The Scud broke up on reentry showering a United States housing compound with debris, and the warhead hit a warehouse serving as a United States barracks in Aujan compound in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. The strong explosion and resulting fire killed 28 United States soldiers from the 475th Quartermaster Group (a United States Army Reserve unit) and injured 100, about half of them seriously. According to one source, most of the injured suffered burns. Initially, some 40 soldiers were believed missing.[82] Most of the soldiers in the warehouse had just arrived and had not completely processed into their units. This, plus the presence of their personnel files and computer records in the same devastated warehouse, played havoc with the ability to account for people.[83] Helicopters eventually evacuated 70 to 100 soldiers to six hospitals including five Saudi facilities.[84] This single incident caused more combat casualties than any other in Operation Desert Storm.[85] Some documentation includes alternative details to this horrific event. One message stated that this incident involved three confirmed launches (one against Dhahran, one against nearby King Fahd Airport and one against Qatar).[86] A press briefing attributed the lack of Patriot engagement to a combination of the warehouse location (housing) and debris trajectory from a disintegrating Scud.[87] The media quoted another senior officer as explaining that "because it [the Scud] had gone into a tumble ' it wasn't within the parameters of where it would be attacked by our missile defense system."[88] D. Scud Incidents in the Riyadh Area 1. Summary Investigators counted 18 Scuds fired against the area of Riyadh during Iraq's missile attacks. Table 4 and the details on selected incidents that follow address these attacks. Table 4. Scud attacks against Riyadh area
2. Details on Selected Incidents a. January 21st Attack on Riyadh (Event 12 in Table 4) Shortly after midnight and within a few minutes of an attack against Dhahran (Event 2 in Table 3), Iraq launched four Scuds in the first attack on the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Patriot batteries in the area launched 26 missiles (eight at the first Scud and six at each that followed) recording kills against all targets.[97] One report noted the Patriots claimed 14 kills at Riyadh and Dhahran combined "'because [Patriot] missiles went after [Patriot] missiles."[98] A log entry suggested that some Patriots fired on fragments from missile intercepts.[99] News media videotapes reportedly captured three ground explosions. One of the ground explosions near an office building blew out the back wall of one structure and produced a 10-foot crater. Twelve people had minor injuries.[100] As in other Scud events, some logs reported a larger number of separate Scuds fired than we could confirm in our analysis of all available evidence.[101] b. January 25th Attack on Riyadh (Event 15 in Table 4) Late in the evening of January 25th, Iraq fired two Scud missiles toward Riyadh. Patriot batteries fired four missiles, reportedly intercepting both Scuds.[102] However, one of the Scud warheads completely demolished a six-story Saudi Department of Interior building in downtown Riyadh killing one Saudi and injuring 30 (most slightly). The warhead struck only a little over a mile south of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation building housing United States Central Command Headquarters.[103] At this building, communications technicians reported hearing a "loud boom" from above. They investigated the roof and found debris from the Scud. Nuclear-biological-chemical specialists who were called to the scene to test for chemical agents did not find any contamination and gave an "all clear."[104] Although other sources reported three or five Scuds heading toward Riyadh,[105] available evidence points to only two Scuds. c. February 3rd Attack on Riyadh (Event 18 in Table 4) After almost five days of no strikes on the KTO, Iraq resumed Scud attacks with a single launch against Riyadh very early on February 3rd.[106] A Patriot battery fired two missiles[107] but apparently failed to disable the Scud warhead, which detonated damaging several buildings and slightly injuring 29 people.[108] One report suggested Iraq launched a second Scud shortly after the first; however, the available evidence does not support this account.[109] Two other sources recorded a successful intercept of the Scud. They stated that the engagement resulted in a mission kill (meaning a Patriot missile deflected the Scud from defended territory or the Scud warhead had significantly reduced effectiveness) and that the warhead hit in the desert east of Riyadh air base.[110] However, the damage and casualties in a populated area noted above attests that at least the warhead struck within the city. We found no evidence concerning chemical warfare agent testing for this event. E. Scud Incidents in the KKMC and Hafir Al Batin Areas 1. Summary Iraq targeted King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and the area around Hafir Al Batin with an estimated nine Scuds beginning in mid-February. See Table 5. 2. Details on Selected Incidents a. February 14th Attack on Hafir Al Batin (Event 23 in Table 5) On February 14, 1991, Iraq fired a barrage of Scud missiles in what was the first attack against the general KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area as well as the first attack against a military target in the middle of the day. The attack against Hafir Al Batin involved at least two Scuds and two different launch locations.[111] Patriot radars near KKMC tracked the Scuds, but because the missiles threatened an area outside the batteries' designated defense zone and range, the crews launched no Patriot missiles against these Scuds.[112] One Scud reportedly exploded in the southeast part of Hafir Al Batin collapsing the side of one house, stripping off the façade of another, and destroying an automobile maintenance workshop along with four or five cars.[113] Another Scud struck in a civilian district, but damage involved only broken windows. These missiles caused four minor injuries.[114] Table 5. Scud attacks against KKMC/Hafir Al Batin area
One log contained plots of five impacts for these attacks, but did not indicate which involved warheads (and hence separate missiles) and which might have resulted from debris. Three impacts happened close to the town and two at some distance to the south and to the east. The log suggested that the additional impacts resulted from one Scud breaking up in flight.[117] Other reports noted that local eyewitnesses claimed a Scud broke up after another Scud missile or a Patriot hit it.[118] An official United States Air Force post-war assessment noted five Scud launches on the 14th.[119] Another Scud-tracking organization listed four launches on February 14th. Scuds struck no other target area on this date.[120] A nuclear-biological-chemical operations summary stated that one Scud in this attack had an airburst suspected of involving a chemical agent warhead. Units did both ground and aerial surveys. Reports did not indicate how the air survey was conducted, but part of the ground survey included use of a Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle. The report noted that no contamination was found and that the air burst really involved the Scud breaking up in flight.[121] Other reporting typifies the variety of accounts that surrounded Scud attacks. From reports that all of the impacts occurred in unoccupied desert areas (but there were casualties and damage in town) to accounts that witnesses saw three air bursts near the town with a warhead separating from one of the missiles (the only report noting three air bursts),[122] unclassified documentation clearly does not present a consistent picture regarding how many missiles were involved in this attack. Based on all available evidence, however, we assess that five separate Scuds struck in the area. b. February 21st Attack on KKMC (Event 25 in Table 5) Iraq launched this attack from the Baghdad area toward KKMC at about 9:00 PM.[123] Missile impact was expected about 12 miles north of the city.[124] However, the missile disintegrated prior to impact, and witnesses observed an air burst. All but two reports indicated Patriots defending the KKMC area did not attempt to engage the Scud.[125] Research revealed no indications of casualties or damage, but one source reported that debris fell in Trailer City, a temporary United States housing area. A United States airman in the housing area remembered the debris falling around him but recalled no injuries.[126] F. Scud Incidents in Israel Iraq fired 42 Scuds that reached Israel or nearby areas of Jordan beginning on January 18, 1991. Iraq launched these missiles from Western Iraq against three general target areas ' Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the Negev Desert in Southern Israel, specifically, Dimona where Israel had a nuclear facility.[127] Figure 6 summarizes the general impact areas for these strikes. Those hitting in the West Bank of Jordan presumably fell short of their intended targets in Israel proper.[128]
Figure 6. Where Scuds landed in or near Israel As noted in Section V, the director of Israel's Scud Recovery Unit indicated none of the missile warheads they recovered had chemical or biological warfare agent components. All had conventional warheads.[129] The director of the Israeli Scud Recovery Unit also noted that when Patriots shot down a Scud, release of the residual rocket oxidizer (inhibited red fuming nitric acid) generated a cloud of yellow mist that caused burning sensations on exposed skin. Some who experienced Scud attacks incorrectly believed this yellow or orange cloud to be nerve agent.[130] See Section VII on Scud oxidizer incidents.
VI. FALSE ALARMS AND FALSE TARGETS Coalition forces in the Kuwait theater of operations responded not only to actual Scud launches but also to many false reports of Scud attacks generated by early warning surveillance assets, intelligence reports, or because Patriots fired at false targets. A. False Alarms After a thorough review of ballistic missile incident accounts from Operation Desert Storm, we determined that at least 60 false alarms were logged in the KTO[131] (in addition to the Patriot false target detections addressed separately below). None of these 60 alarms documented an actual missile attack, but they may have created the impression that such attacks occurred more frequently than was the case. Even though many of these alerts were cancelled within minutes, many servicemembers and civilians took appropriate measures, donned chemical protective gear, and sought shelter. We believe (because alerts were canceled promptly) that misinterpretation of initial infrared (heat-source) detections by satellites led to most of these false alarms. At least two other false alarms came from detection of signals from a radar associated with Scud operations (it tracks weather balloons to determine winds aloft). The United States operations, intelligence, and space communities collectively made history when they developed a system to provide warning of Iraq's ballistic missile launches to the entire KTO (and Israel) within minutes.[132] This system relied primarily on space-based infrared surveillance. However, across any combat theater, there are many non-missile infrared sources including exploding bombs, high intensity flares, demolitions of weapons storage sites, and other sudden heat-producing events capable of registering on infrared-sensitive devices. Because warning time was at a premium, some early alerts proved false, but the goal was always to notify quickly to protect lives.[133] On January 17th, the day the air campaign began, a Scud warning shortly after 4:00 AM put many bases and units in the Dhahran area into MOPP Level 3 (full protective gear except gloves ' see glossary in Tab A).[134] Reports even noted confirmed missile impacts in the area[135] and Scud fragments collected.[136] The warning was eventually cancelled.[137] A mobile Army surgical hospital (MASH) chronology includes the following for January 17th:
Figure 7 summarizes the false alarms during Operation Desert Storm. These false alarms declined in frequency after the first eight days of the war. The decline possibly reflected refined human judgment or adjustments in procedures. In addition to the detections graphed, United States Space Command generated five false alarms from December 25-30, 1990, three the result of live ballistic missile test firings by Iraq.[139]
Figure 7. False alarms during Operation Desert Storm B. Patriot False Target Detections According to information published after the Gulf War, a problem with the Patriot radar system caused Patriot missiles to fire at phantom targets. In September 1992, an Army official admitted that electronic signals, or noise, emitted by a variety of United States systems caused computer problems and accidentally launched Patriot missiles in the first week of the war. The Patriot's radar system processed these signals as the result of software flaws and a design that left the back of the radar unit open to stray signals. These signals came from the airborne warning and control system aircraft, radar jamming pods on fighters, test equipment, airport radars, and communications systems. Software changes and makeshift shrouds for the backs of Patriot radars eventually resolved the problem.[140] During the early stages of the air war that began on January 17, computers automatically directed the Patriot missile batteries' threat responses. Soldiers in Patriot units did not have a role in the fire, no-fire decisions. Patriot units later revised the procedures, and changed to a manual mode of engagement that allowed operators to decide when to fire.[141] The first actual ballistic missile attack against the KTO occurred against the Dhahran area at 9:43 PM on January 20, 1991. However, false targets involving Patriot reactions began on January 18, 1991, without warnings from national surveillance assets. Veterans aware of these engagements believed, at least at the time, that incoming missiles threatened them. Most reports did not identify the January 18th incidents as reactions to Patriot false targets until after the war when the discrepancy became public knowledge. For example, during the war, one Army document noted for the 18th that Patriots intercepted a single Scud in the Dhahran area.[142] Alpha Battery, 2nd Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery got credit for a first successful Scud intercept. An element of the XVIII Airborne Corps reported seeing a Scud missile heading south. Three powerful explosions occurred over Dhahran Air Base. This report claimed that three missiles had been fired at Dhahran. The same document indicated that Patriots engaged one incoming missile but that another hit Khobar, an area where United States forces were billeted. The entire Dhahran area was reported at MOPP Level four with lower MOPP levels ordered further west.[143] A Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle searched for evidence of chemical warfare agent but found none.[144] One chronology stated that the explosions happened when a friendly aircraft released bombs into an ordnance jettison area.[145] We found only one contemporaneous record that indicated (correctly) that the reports of ballistic missiles launched at Dhahran on the 18th were erroneous.[146] Despite the flurry of Patriot false targets early in the war (some interspersed with real attacks), we found no evidence that Patriots engaged false targets after January 23, 1991 (presumably because of the equipment and software fixes). Figure 8 shows how the 20 false target detections break down by day based on research of unclassified and declassified operational reporting.[147] Patriots did not launch missiles at every false target, but one report indicated that Patriot batteries fired a total of 22 missiles at false targets. In another report, an official admitted that the number was 24.[148]
Figure 8. False Patriot detections by date
VII. SCUD OXIDIZER INCIDENTS As Israeli officials pointed out to us, when reentering Scuds were intercepted or broke up on their own, they sometimes released a yellow-to-reddish-to-brownish cloud of the Scud's residual propellant oxidizer. People on the ground observing these clouds voiced concerns that the airborne releases involved chemical warfare agent. Incoming Al Hussein missiles contained about 300 pounds of residual oxidizer and 100 pounds of fuel. The oxidizer and accompanying oxides of nitrogen were dangerous in their own right and caused a range of symptoms in people exposed on the ground.[149] Iraq's Scud oxidizer, inhibited red nitric acid (IRFNA), can cause deep and painful burns on the skin or in the lungs. When inhaled, the oxidizer and its nitrogen oxide decomposition products can produce immediate or delayed symptoms including throat dryness, cough, headache, dizziness, anxiety, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, labored breathing, inflammation of the lungs, choking, fluid build-up in the lungs, and suffocation, depending on the extent of exposure.[150] In interviews with our investigators, or during testimony before government panels, Gulf War veterans reported a variety of symptoms consistent with oxidizer exposure. Extracted from their accounts, these symptoms included tearing eyes, runny noses, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, sleeplessness, headaches, and blurred vision.[151] Kerosene, the fuel component of Scud propellants also escaped during breakups. Kerosene is not particularly toxic, even after acute exposure, and is used, for example, as barbecue lighter fluid and in jet fuels.[152] Readers wanting additional information on Scud oxidizer should consult our information paper on IRFNA.[153]
VIII. COALITION RESPONSE TO SCUD THREAT The Coalition took strong actions to protect forces and civilians and diminish the impact of Scud attacks. The Coalition considered Scuds a military and psychological threat to their forces, populations, and interests. Scud threat reduction efforts went forward on several fronts and included expanded surveillance and warning, deploying Patriot surface-to-air missiles with some ballistic missile intercept capability, air strikes against production and storage facilities, and attempts to destroy Scud units in the field before or after they launched missiles.[154] The key component of the Scud alert process was the Defense Support Program surveillance satellites (see Figure 9)[155] that identified launches by detecting the infrared energy from a rocket in powered flight.[156] During Operation Desert Storm, United States Space Command quickly assessed the downlinked infrared detections and rapidly passed alert data to United States Central Command and other allies.[157] According to one source, military radars in the region could track missiles and aid in the extrapolation process to identify potential target areas.[158]
Figure 9. DSP surveillance satellite[159] In another response to the Scud threat, the United States deployed Patriot surface-to-air missile units to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Tab A includes a Patriot system description. Figure 10 summarizes the targets at which post-war analysis determined the Patriots fired.[160]
Figure 10. Patriots expended by target area Part of the Coalition strategy for dealing with Scuds involved pre-planned air strikes against associated production and storage facilities.[161] These strikes were concentrated during the early part of the air campaign.[162] Another component of United States reaction to protect Coalition forces was Scud hunting. Beginning with the initial Scud attacks against Israel on January 18, 1991, and Saudi Arabia on January 20, 1991, United States forces came under enormous pressure to do something about the immediate Scud threat. Reportedly, the United States leadership in Washington, DC, focused on the potential diplomatic and political fallout from Scuds, while most senior air commanders believed that Scuds "did not represent a particularly credible military threat" (emphasis original). As Air Force Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, commander of the United States Air Force Component United States Central Command observed, the Scud was "a lousy weapon."[163] Nevertheless, the Coalition diverted considerable resources to attempt to neutralize Iraq's Scuds. Figure 11 displays in parallel graphs the number of total sorties dedicated to counter-Scud operations of all kinds (right) and the number of Iraq's Scuds attacking the KTO and Israel (left). Day 1 was January 17, 1991, and Day 43 was February 28, 1991.
Figure 11. Scuds fired and anti-Scud sorties flown by day[164] Scud units in the field proved difficult to locate and hit. What became known as "the Great Scud Hunt" had questionable operational effectiveness. As the United States Gulf War Air Power Survey noted, most, and possibly all of the 100 mobile launchers reported struck by Coalition aircraft appeared later to have involved decoys, other vehicles, or other objects that presented Scud-like signatures.[165]
IX. THE RESIDUAL THREAT The United Nations Special Commission supervised destruction of 48 Scuds plus additional components and found evidence that Iraq unilaterally destroyed at least another 83 missiles unsupervised.[166] However, many estimates point to a substantial residual Scud inventory. Some data points from various sources include:
X. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS The results of our Scud missile research and analysis can be summarized as follows:
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